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ABSTRACT
Collusion-Resistant Fingerprinting for Multimedia
in a Broadcast Channel Environment. (December 2004)
William Luh, B.A., University of Toronto
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Deepa Kundur
Digital ﬁngerprinting is a method by which a copyright owner can uniquely
embed a buyer-dependent, inconspicuous serial number (representing the ﬁngerprint)
into every copy of digital data that is legally sold. The buyer of a legal copy is
then deterred from distributing further copies, because the unique ﬁngerprint can be
used to trace back the origin of the piracy. The major challenge in ﬁngerprinting is
collusion, an attack in which a coalition of pirates compare several of their uniquely
ﬁngerprinted copies for the purpose of detecting and removing the ﬁngerprints.
The objectives of this work are two-fold. First, we investigate the need for ro-
bustness against large coalitions of pirates by introducing the concept of a malicious
distributor that has been overlooked in prior work. A novel ﬁngerprinting code that
has superior codeword length in comparison to existing work under this novel mali-
cious distributor scenario is developed. In addition, ideas presented in the proposed
ﬁngerprinting design can easily be applied to existing ﬁngerprinting schemes, making
them more robust to collusion attacks.
Second, a new framework termed Joint Source Fingerprinting that integrates the
processes of watermarking and codebook design is introduced. The need for this new
paradigm is motivated by the fact that existing ﬁngerprinting methods result in a
perceptually undistorted multimedia after collusion is applied. In contrast, the new
paradigm equates the process of collusion amongst a coalition of pirates, to degrading
iv
the perceptual characteristics, and hence commercial value of the multimedia in ques-
tion. Thus by enforcing that the process of collusion diminishes the commercial value
of the content, the pirates are deterred from attacking the ﬁngerprints. A ﬁngerprint-
ing algorithm for video as well as an eﬃcient means of broadcasting or distributing
ﬁngerprinted video is also presented. Simulation results are provided to verify our
theoretical and empirical observations.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The ease at which digital data can be perfectly reproduced has made piracy, the
illegal distribution of content, a growing threat for content distributors and copyright
holders. As illegal copies of digital data, such as video, and audio proliferate over
the Internet, an emerging interest in protecting copyrighted material has surfaced.
One such method of protecting copyrighted material is called digital ﬁngerprinting.
Digital ﬁngerprinting is a method by which a copyright owner can uniquely embed
a buyer-dependent, inconspicuous serial number (representing the ﬁngerprint) into
every copy of digital data that is legally sold. The buyer of a legal copy is then
deterred from distributing further copies, because the unique ﬁngerprint can be used
to trace back the origin of the piracy. In this sense, ﬁngerprinting is a passive form
of security eﬀective after an attack has been applied, which is in contrast to active
forms of security, such as encryption, that prevent the attack in the ﬁrst place.
The major challenge in ﬁngerprinting is that all legally distributed copies of
the same digital data are similar, with the exception of the unique buyer-dependent
ﬁngerprints. A coalition of pirates who possess distinctly ﬁngerprinted copies of the
same data can therefore exploit this diversity, by comparing their digital data, and
possibly detecting, and then rendering the ﬁngerprints unreadable. Such an attack is
known as collusion. One goal of ﬁngerprinting is thus to ensure that some part of the
ﬁngerprint is capable of surviving a collusion attack, so as to identify at least one of
the pirates.
For multimedia ﬁngerprinting, an extra level of robustness is required compared
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2to other types of data. Robustness is equivalent to the ﬁngerprint’s ability to remain
traceable after intentional or unintentional modiﬁcation of the ﬁngerprinted media. In
general, multimedia can withstand some amount of (single) user-generated distortion,
such that this distortion is imperceptible to the end-user. A coalition of pirates
might then individually modify their multimedia in addition to applying the collusion
attack. Hence a ﬁngerprinting scheme for multimedia should also be robust to some
amount of user-generated distortion. Examples of common user-generated distortions
are additive white Gaussian noise, linear ﬁltering such as blurring with Gaussian
or Laplacian point spread functions, JPEG compression, geometric distortions such
as cropping and resizing, among others [1, 2]. Since ﬁngerprinting has the goal of
traceability, ﬁngerprinting for digital media should be robust to both collusion as
well as user-generated distortions.
In applications such as Video on Demand (VoD), it is impractical to send a
unique ﬁngerprinted video to each subscriber, because bandwidth usage is excessive.
The solution to this problem is to send identical digital data to all subscribers, and
then at the user end, build a uniquely ﬁngerprinted video. Such a scheme is referred
to as ﬁngerprinting in a broadcast channel environment.
A. Contributions of This Thesis
The contributions of this thesis are two-fold. First, a novel ﬁngerprinting code that
has superior codeword length (in comparison to existing work under assumptions
such as the "malicious distributor" to be described later) is developed. Existing
ﬁngerprinting schemes strive to achieve codes that are minimal in codeword length,
yet possess a tolerable probability of error in the face of collusion [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
This thesis motivates the need for robustness against large coalition sizes (i.e., large
3numbers of colluders), by introducing the concept of a malicious distributor that has
been overlooked in prior work. The proposed ﬁngerprinting code is shown to be more
robust than existing codes for such a problem. Finally, ideas presented in the proposed
ﬁngerprinting design can easily be applied to existing ﬁngerprinting schemes, making
them more robust to collusion attacks.
The second major contribution is the introduction of a new framework that
integrates the processes of watermarking and codebook design (called the traditional
multi-step paradigm in this thesis). This novel single-step approach is termed Joint
Source Fingerprinting (JSF). The JSF approach is fundamentally diﬀerent because
it equates the process of collusion amongst a coalition of pirates, to degrading the
perceptual characteristics, and hence commercial value of the multimedia in question.
Thus by enforcing that the process of collusion diminishes the commercial value of the
content, the colluders are deterred from attacking the ﬁngerprints. This characteristic
is in direct contrast to existing ﬁngerprinting methods that result in a perceptually
identical multimedia after collusion is applied. In addition to proposing the new
framework, a working algorithm for digital video and simulation results are provided
to verify empirical and theoretical observations.
B. Structure of This Thesis
This section gives the reader an overview of the chapters to follow. Chapter II,
Problem Formulation, presents the traditional ﬁngerprinting problem for multimedia,
showing how general codes, modulation, watermarking, and broadcasting processes
are integrated to produce a ﬁngerprinted media that is distributed to an end-user.
The problem addressed in this thesis is limited in scope to the novel design of the
ﬁngerprinting codebook. Attacks on ﬁngerprinting systems are then presented, in-
4troducing the reader to three particular types of attacks: codebook, single-user, and
multimedia collusion. The chapter concludes by deﬁning the exact problem studied
in this thesis.
The purpose of Chapter III, entitled Literature Review, is to survey research
pertaining primarily to codebook design, the focus of this work. The chapter brieﬂy
introduces other areas and paradigms of multimedia ﬁngerprinting to show the inter-
relationship of these works to the goal of the thesis. The review of codebook design
is categorized into random, structured, and concatenated classes, depicting a com-
prehensive history and trend of codebook design. Focus is placed on reviewing code
design principles that are eﬀective for ﬁngerprint development. A comparison of these
codes is presented in the next chapter, along with the proposed novel code.
Chapter IV, entitled A Novel Fingerprinting Code, marks the ﬁrst novel contri-
bution of this thesis. This chapter presents new code design methodologies, fortiﬁes
existing codes that are fundamentally weak, and compares the proposed novel code
with selected codes reviewed in the previous chapter. In addition, a new problem, not
previously addressed by other work, is presented, for which the novel code is shown
to excel.
The novel Joint Source Fingerprinting paradigm is discussed in Chapter V, moti-
vating its need and power. A general analytical description of the JSF methodology is
presented. Then a suboptimal JSF algorithm targeted for digital video is presented.
In addition, support for a greater number of users, as well as communication broad-
casting is discussed for this speciﬁc JSF algorithm. Finally simulation results are
presented and compared to verify the theoretical observations.
Chapter VI summarizes the achievements in this thesis, and presents future work
to extend this research.
5CHAPTER II
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Traditionally, the problem of digital ﬁngerprinting has been separated into multiple
components that are designed and optimized individually [3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10]. Figure
1 shows a breakdown of the overall problem into sub-problems, presented as the
leaves of the tree diagram. The problem of designing a ﬁngerprinting scheme consists
Collusion-Resistant Fingerprinting for Multimedia in a Broadcast
Channel Environment
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Fig. 1. Components of the Problem
of designing a ﬁngerprinting code, and a watermarking scheme that is employed to
embed the code into the multimedia data. Use of the ﬁngerprinting scheme in a
broadcast channel environment1 can be conducted in many ways [3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
and often depends on the nature of the ﬁngerprinting process. It is therefore natural
to consider solving the individual sub-problems in the following order: ﬁngerprinting
code, watermarking scheme, and broadcast channel environment.
Next, each component is mathematically deﬁned.
1Recall from Chapter I that broadcasting can help reduce bandwidth usage for
applications such as Video on Demand (VoD).
6A. Fingerprinting Scheme
A ﬁngerprinting scheme consists of two components: the ﬁngerprinting code, and the
watermarking scheme.
1. Fingerprinting Code
This section begins with the problem formulation of the ﬁngerprinting code. A ﬁn-
gerprinting code consists of a codebook, and a tracing algorithm.
Definition 1 A codebook is a set Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γM} ⊆ Σl  {s1s2 · · · sl|si ∈ Σ},
of M codewords of length l, over some ﬁnite alphabet Σ. Any subset Γ′ ⊂ Γ is also a
valid codebook. Also, γi can be written as γi = γi1γ
i
2 · · · γil .
Definition 2 A tracing algorithm A, is a function Σl → P(Σl)\{∅}, where P(Σl) is
the power set of Σl.
In a ﬁngerprinting scheme, each codeword from Γ is assigned to a diﬀerent user. The
goal of a malicious coalition of users is to combine their codewords to produce a new
word η, such that η cannot be traced back to the coalition.2
Definition 3 A successful collusion attack by a coalition of M users with codewords
in Γ, is a function Z, such that η = Z(Γ), and A(η) /∈ P(Γ)\{∅}.
A typical family of candidate attack functions includes the class of Marking Assump-
tion attacks [3] to be discussed later in this chapter. While the adversaries of ﬁnger-
printing must design a successful attack function Z, the advocates of ﬁngerprinting
must design a codebook, and a tracing algorithm to counter collusion attacks.
2The new word η is not necessarily a codeword, because it is possible to have
η /∈ Γ. Therefore, when referring to a word formed via the collusion attack, the preﬁx
code is discarded, and η is just called a word.
7Definition 4 The triple (Γ,A,Θ), consisting of codebook Γ of cardinality M , tracing
algorithm A, and a family of attack functions Θ, is said to be c-collusion-resistant
to attacks from Θ with ε-error (0 < ε  1) if the following properties are satisﬁed:
∀ Γ′ ⊆ Γ, |Γ′| ≤ c < M , let η = Z(Γ′) for Z ∈ Θ, then Pr [A(η) ∈ P(Γ′)\{∅}] > 1−ε.
Note, Deﬁnition 4 also resists the framing of innocent users, as the tracing algorithm
A will exclusively produce a subset of codewords from Γ′, the codebook belonging to
the colluders.
2. Watermarking Scheme
A digital watermark is an imperceptible mark, such as a logo, that is embedded into
digital media3. To quantify the meaning of imperceptibility, a metric d(·, ·) ≥ 0 is
deﬁned to measure the similarity between any two multimedia signals C, C˜i. Let
T > 0 be a threshold variable such that d(C, C˜1)  T implies C and C˜1 are not
visually similar, while d(C, C˜1) < T implies they are visually similar. For example,
d(C, C˜1) can represent the Euclidean distance, or mean square error (MSE) between
C and C˜1. The threshold T is dependent on the human visual system for images and
video and a function of the human auditory system for audio.
A watermarking algorithm takes a host media, a watermark, a key, and embeds
the watermark into the host in an imperceptible manner.
Definition 5 A watermarking algorithm is a function W : C×W×L → C, where C
is a set of multimedia, W is a set of watermarks, and L is a set of keys. In addition,
for any C ∈ C, W ∈ W, and L ∈ L, W(C,W,L) is the watermarked multimedia,
such that d(W(C,W,L), C) < T .
3In contrast to ﬁngerprinting, watermarking focuses on the signal processing as-
pects of embedding data in multimedia. As such, issues of collusion and code design
are beyond its scope.
8Watermarks are extracted from watermarked multimedia via an extraction function
X .
Definition 6 A blind watermark extraction function X , is a function C × L → W,
such that X (W(C,W,L), L) = W .
The term blind is traditionally used in the watermarking literature [16] to denote
extraction of the watermark without direct reference to the original multimedia C.
The goal of an attacker may be to remove or modify the embedded watermark,
hence interfering with its security.
Definition 7 A feasible attack F on watermarked multimedia, given W, but not L,
is a function C → C, such that d(F(W(C,W,L)), C) < T .
The attack deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7, allows the attacker to have knowledge of the wa-
termarking algorithm, but not the key, which is known as Kerckhoﬀ’s Principle [16].
In addition, the attack is restricted to have no perceptual eﬀect on the watermarked
multimedia preserving, hence its commercial value. A blind watermarking scheme is
said to be robust to a particular attack if the extraction function is able to extract
the watermark after the given attack.
Definition 8 A blind watermarking scheme that is strictly-robust to a feasible attack
F , is a triple (W,X ,F), such that X (F(W(C,W,L)), L) = W . A blind watermark-
ing scheme that is τ -robust to a feasible attack F , is a triple (W,X ,F), such that
X (F(W(C,W,L)), L) = W˜ , and d(W˜ ,W ) < τ .
An example of a feasible attack is the additive white Gaussian noise with noise power
σ2 [16, 2]; that is,
F(W(C,W,L), L) =W(C,W,L) + n (2.1)
9where n is an appropriately sized noise vector comprised of Gaussian random pro-
cesses, with a constant power spectral density (PSD) at σ2. The attack in Equation
2.1 is made feasible by controlling σ2.
The watermark W in a ﬁngerprinting system represents information about the
ﬁngerprint code in a manner that allows it to be imperceptibly and robustly embed-
ded in the multimedia. In practice, a modulation function is required to map the
codewords into unique watermarks [8]. Correspondingly, the demodulation function
is used to map watermarks back to codewords [8].
Definition 9 A modulation function M : Γ → W is a bijection, and its inverse
function is the demodulation function M−1 = B : W → Γ.
Deﬁnition 9 ties together the ﬁngerprinting code and the watermarking scheme, thus
completing the problem formulation of the ﬁngerprinting scheme. The modulation
and watermarking process, along with its inverse operations are depicted in Figure 2.
B. Fingerprinting in a Broadcast Channel Environment
The second component of the multi-step ﬁngerprinting scheme is the integration of
ﬁngerprinting into a broadcast channel environment. Let C represent the multimedia
to be distributed to buyers. In this thesis, C is comprised of a set of N frames,
C = {C1, C2, . . . CN} that represents a video sequence.
In a broadcast distribution scenario, conﬁdentiality of the multimedia during
transmission through the use of encryption is necessary. Let E, the encryption func-
tion, represent an operator that maps C, and a set of keys K, to the set Cˆ of encrypted
C, such that any Cˆ ∈ Cˆ cannot be understood by eavesdroppers without the appro-
priate key.
A particular Cˆ is sent to M receivers who have legally purchased the video C.
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Fig. 2. Modulation and Watermarking, and Inverse Operations
Each receiver has unique keys, K1, K2, . . .KM . An operator D, the decryption func-
tion, maps Cˆ and K = {K1, K2, . . . , KM}, to C˜, in which C˜i ∈ C˜ is the ﬁngerprinted
version of C, containing the unique ﬁngerprint for receiver i. This scheme is depicted
in Figure 3. This architecture is adopted because a single Cˆ is sent to all users, saving
both bandwidth, as well as the complexity that is inherent in schemes that involve
sending M unique encrypted content to each user [3, 12].
Referring to the notations introduced in Figure 3, the following requirements are
necessary:
(1) Scrambled video signal: d(C, Cˆ)  T . The encrypted Cˆ does not visually
resemble the unencrypted C, making it unintelligible.
(2) Unique fingerprinted videos: ∀i = j, d(C˜i, C˜j) = 0, and d(C, C˜i) < T . C˜i
should also contain codewords that are collusion-resistant (Deﬁnition 4) and
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Fig. 3. Problem Formulation of Fingerprinting in a Broadcast Channel Environment
the watermarking scheme should be robust to a set of feasible attacks, such as
AWGN (Equation 2.1).
(3) Encryption Security: Without keys K1, K2, . . .KM , an eavesdropper, or the
operator D, cannot with computational eﬃciency [17] derive a C¯ given Cˆ, such
that d(C, C¯) < T .
(4) Frame-proof: It is computationally complex to create any set of keys {Ki} ⊂
{K1, K2, . . .KM}, given any another set of keys {Kj} ⊂ {K1, K2, . . .KM},
where {Ki} ∩ {Kj} = ∅.
In this thesis, issues of encryption security are not discussed, therefore Criteria 2 is
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the focus of this thesis.
It should be noted that the proposed scheme is diﬀerent from the watermark-
ing and multicast schemes in [13, 14] that employ the "trusted" network itself to
ﬁngerprint the multimedia in transit. A discussion on the diﬀerent broadcasting ar-
chitectures and their pros and cons can be found in [18]. The scheme described in this
thesis makes no use of the communications network itself. In addition, the underlying
assumption is that each time the transmitter sends data, all the users receive exactly
the same data; there is no way for the transmitter to only to send data to some users,
but not others. This assumption alleviates the restriction of distributing the digital
data in question over a communication network, allowing for distribution schemes
such as the Compact-Disc (CD) medium; for example, CDs ﬁt into this broadcast-
ing assumption, because they are uncustomized and mass-produced, much like Cˆ in
Figure 3 [3].
A notation that encapsulates the process of modulation, watermarking, collu-
sion, feasible attacks, extraction, and demodulation is now introduced. Suppose
C˜1, C˜2, . . . , C˜M (in Figure 3) are ﬁngerprinted with codewords from Γ. Then de-
ﬁne x = B(X (F(C), L)), where C is the multimedia after collusion, as in Figure 3. Γ
is called the underlying codebook of x, and the relationship is denoted as Γ ⇒ x. If
Γ was not used, then the notation is Γ  x. This notation is useful as it succinctly
ties together the processes from the transmitter, through the attack channel, to the
receiver.
C. General Overview of the Complete Problem
The sections above formulated the problem piece by piece. The complete problem is
stated in this section. In the multimedia ﬁngerprinting for a broadcast channel envi-
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ronment problem, the goal is to design (E,D, {Ki}Mi=1), such that E is the encryption
mechanism, D is the decryption mechanism that also results in unique ﬁngerprinted
data given unique keys {Ki}Mi=1. In addition, (E,D, {Ki}Mi=1) should adhere to the
requirements in Section B. To achieve unique ﬁngerprinted data, (E,D, {Ki}Mi=1) has
a sub-layer consisting of (Γ,M,W). A receiver is also to be designed, consisting of
(A,B,X ). Ideally, (Γ,A) is M-collusion-resistant to attacks generated by higher-level
attacks on the multimedia, such as scrambling, and linear estimation and (W,X ,F)
is τ -robust to common single-user attacks, which will be discussed in the next section.
D. Attacks
This section presents 3 types of attacks: codebook attacks, single-user attacks, and
multimedia collusion attacks. In codebook attacks, the collusion attacks are modeled
as being applied directly to the codewords that are available to a coalition; the media
in which the codewords are embedded into are not considered. This is a good starting
point in designing a ﬁngerprinting scheme under the multi-step paradigm, as depicted
in Figure 1, because it decouples code and watermark design. In single-user attacks,
the attack, involving one user and traditionally found in the watermarking literature,
is applied directly to the media. Finally, the multimedia collusion attack is applied
directly to several copies of ﬁngerprinted multimedia.
1. Codebook Attacks
In [19], to assess the strength of a collusion attack, the word y = Z(Γ′), Γ′ ⊆ Γ,
generated by collusion is generalized and represented by a conditional probability
distribution, conditioned on a particular coalition. Here, the generalization will be
presented more formally. Let Y be the set of possible attacked words, G = P(Γ),
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the power set of the codebook Γ, and Ω = Y ∪ G. Let (Ω, a, P ) be a probability
space, where a is a σ-algebra generated from Ω. For y ∈ Y and g ∈ G, P ({y, g})
gives the "joint probability" that collusion amongst a set of codewords g will result
in a word y. This is the most general representation of an attack, because any word
can be generated from any coalition with some non-zero probability. This is however
not useful from the point of view of ﬁngerprinting code design, since P ({y, g}) is not
known a priori4.
This unrestricted, general attack presented above is diﬃcult to counter, and
hence more restrictive assumptions need to be made concerning what a coalition can
and cannot do, given a set of codewords. The most widely used assumption is called
the Marking Assumption [3], which is assumed in the majority of the ﬁngerprinting
literature, because it allows the ﬁngerprinting problem to be solved from a coding
perspective.
Definition 10 (Marking Assumption) For codebook Γ of cardinality M , the word
η = η1η2 · · ·ηl = Z(Γ) conforms to the Marking Assumption when the following
condition is true:
γ1i = γ
2
i = · · · γMi =⇒ ηi = γi (2.2)
Such codeword positions are called undetectable.
Deﬁnition 10 states that the positions in the codewords that yield the same alphabet
cannot be changed by the coalition.
In Deﬁnition 4, Θ is the attack family. For example, any attacks that conform
to the Marking Assumption can constitute a family of attacks. Another way to
4In [20], P ({g}), the probability that a coalition with codwords from g will collude,
is assumed to be known, and the codes are designed with this knowledge; a tree
structure is employed to group together users who are more likely to collude.
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encapsulate a family of attacks, is by deﬁning the space in which attacked words can
fall in; in [19], this is called the envelope.
Definition 11 (Attack Envelope) The attack envelope of Z ∈ Θ, is the range of
Z.
The envelope gives the set of all attacked words, whereas Θ only gives the attack
mechanism itself. The deﬁnitions that follow, present envelopes used in this thesis
that satisfy the Marking Assumption.
A narrow-sense attack belongs to the class of Marking Assumption attacks, and
results in words in the narrow-sense envelope (Deﬁnition 12), which only allows de-
tectable alphabets to be mapped to alphabets found in the same position.
Definition 12 (Narrow-sense Envelope) The narrow-sense envelope of Z(Γ) is
the set
e(Γ) = {x | (γ1i = γ2i = · · · γMi =⇒ xi = γi) ∧ xi ∈ {γji }Mj=1} (2.3)
For example, given the words Γ = {abd, acd, ged}, aad /∈ e(Γ), because the alphabets
in the second position are b, c, e, but not a, even though a is detectable in the ﬁrst
position.
A wide-sense attack (envelope given in Deﬁnition 13) is similar to the narrow-
sense attack, except any detectable alphabet can be mapped to any other detectable
alphabet, not necessarily in the same position.
Definition 13 (Wide-sense Envelope) The wide-sense envelope of Z(Γ) is the set
E(Γ) = {x | (γ1i = γ2i = · · · γMi =⇒ xi = γi) ∧ xi ∈ Q ⊆ Σ} (2.4)
where Q is the set of detectable alphabets in Γ.
In the previous example, aad ∈ E(Γ), and even agd ∈ E(Γ). So the narrow-sense
attack is more restrictive than the wide-sense attack.
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In the extended narrow-sense attack (envelope given in Deﬁnition 14), the rules
are the same as the narrow-sense attack, except any detectable word can also be
"erased"; that is the erasure symbol is one that does not belong to the alphabet.
Definition 14 (Extended Narrow-sense Envelope) The narrow-sense envelope
of Z(Γ) is the set
e∗(Γ) = {x | (γ1i = γ2i = · · · γMi =⇒ xi = γi) ∧ xi ∈ {γji }Mj=1 ∪ {∗}} (2.5)
where ∗ /∈ Σ.
Finally, the extended wide-sense attack (envelope given in Deﬁnition 15) is the most
general Marking Assumption attack, allowing detectable alphabets to be mapped to
any detectable alphabet, as well as being erased.
Definition 15 (Extended Wide-sense Envelope) The wide-sense envelope of Z(Γ)
is the set
E∗(Γ) = {x | (γ1i = γ2i = · · · γMi =⇒ xi = γi) ∧ xi ∈ Q ⊆ Σ ∪ {∗}} (2.6)
where Q is the set of detectable alphabets in Γ, and ∗ /∈ Σ.
It can be shown [3] that in order to be c-collusion resistant with 0-error, Equation
2.7 must be satisﬁed: ∀Γi ⊂ Γ, |Γi| ≤ c
⋂
Γi = ∅ =⇒
⋂
E∗(Γi) = ∅ (2.7)
Unfortunately as shown in [3], this is not achievable with  = 0, when c ≥ 2, and
hence there must be a non-zero error.
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2. Single-User Attacks
Feasible attacks on multimedia as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7 are now presented. These
attacks involve one copy of the multimedia in question and can be categorized into
unintentional attacks and intentional attacks [2]. Unintentional attacks are those
that occur due to bandwidth constraints, such as lossy copying and transcoding (i.e.
compression, change in frame rate, format conversion, conversion in display format).
Intentional attacks are those user-generated attacks that aim to remove the water-
mark or ﬁngerprint in the multimedia. Intentional attacks on video can be catego-
rized into single-frame attacks and statistical attacks [2]. Single-frame attacks can be
categorized into signal processing attacks (i.e. band-pass ﬁltering, adaptive Wiener
denoising [2], etc.) and desynchronizing attacks (i.e. aﬃne transformations, scaling,
cropping, etc.) [2]. Statistical attacks for video are sometimes also called collusion.
However, there is only one copy of the video in question and the term arises from the
fact that consecutive frames in the video are used together to remove the watermark
or ﬁngerprint. A simple statistical attack on video is to average a small set of con-
secutive frames in hopes that this will remove the watermark. A more sophisticated
statistical attack is to ﬁrst estimate the watermark in each individual frame and then
average the estimated watermarks to obtain a ﬁnal estimation, which is then sub-
tracted from each frame. Figure 4 shows the classiﬁcation of single-user attacks. In
this thesis, the following single-user attacks are considered: AWGN from Equation
2.1, JPEG compression, small rotations, and translation of random blocks, which will
be described in detail later in this thesis.
The next section presents collusion attacks directly on the multimedia, by com-
paring several copies of the same video with diﬀerent ﬁngerprints embedded. The
attacks involve combining matching frames from multiple copies as opposed to con-
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secutive frames from one copy.
3. Multimedia Collusion
Collusion attacks applied directly on multiple copies of multimedia are now presented.
Figure 5 shows one possible classiﬁcation of collusion on ﬁngerprinted multimedia.
When ﬁngerprints are embedded into multimedia, pirates can collude to estimate the
original non-ﬁngerprinted multimedia. The collusion attack becomes an estimation
problem, and derives many techniques from Estimation Theory. On the other hand,
pirates might try to scramble the ﬁngerprint in hopes of framing an innocent buyer,
or simply creating a non-compliant ﬁngerprint. The second technique is more ad-hoc,
and weaker than the ﬁrst, although it is also computationally cheaper.
Before presenting the attacks, the notation Cj(x, y) describes the jth frame at
the (x, y)th pixel of the attacked video C. The notation C˜ji (x, y) describes the j
th
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Fig. 5. Types of Collusion on Fingerprinted Multimedia
frame at the (x, y)th pixel of ﬁngerprinted video for User i.
Equation 2.8 deﬁnes the majority attack (which can also be considered an esti-
mation attack, although this relationship is not shown in Figure 5) using the MODE
operation from statistics, which chooses the most common value from a set.
Cj(x, y) = MODE
(
C˜j1(x, y), C˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , C˜
j
M(x, y)
)
(2.8)
The random attack selects pixels from the ﬁngerprinted multimedia with equal
probability. Equation 2.9 deﬁnes the random attack using the UNIFORM−RANDOM
operation, which selects the indices with equal probability.
Cj(x, y) = C˜jUNIFORM−RANDOM(1,2,...,M)(x, y) (2.9)
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The simplest suboptimal estimation technique, is simply to average the set of
multimedia, as in Equation 2.10.
Cj(x, y) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
C˜ji (x, y) (2.10)
For additional estimation attacks found in Figure 5, the reader is referred to Appendix
A.
The order statistics attacks found in [21], consists of the min, max, minmax,
median, modiﬁed negative, and randomized negative deﬁned in Equations 2.11 to
2.16.
Cjmin(x, y) = min
(
C˜j1(x, y), C˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , C˜
j
M(x, y)
)
(2.11)
Cjmax(x, y) = max
(
C˜j1(x, y), C˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , C˜
j
M(x, y)
)
(2.12)
Cjmed(x, y) = median
(
C˜j1(x, y), C˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , C˜
j
M(x, y)
)
(2.13)
Cjmin-max(x, y) =
1
2
(
min({C˜ji (x, y)}Mi=1) + max({C˜ji (x, y)}Mi=1)
)
(2.14)
Cjmod-neg(x, y) = C
j
min(x, y) + C
j
max(x, y)− Cjmed(x, y) (2.15)
Cjrand-neg(x, y) =
 C
j
min(x, y) with probability p
Cjmax(x, y) with probability 1− p
(2.16)
E. The Problem Addressed by This Thesis
In this thesis, the ﬁrst contribution is in designing (Γ,A,Θ) for the extended narrow-
sense attack, and also providing a means to extend existing codes that are less robust,
in such a way that they become robust to the the extended narrow-sense attack.
At the same time, the code should have relatively short codeword length5 for large
coalition sizes. In previous works, the codeword length grows very fast when coalition
5The reason why minimizing codeword length is important, is because a codeword
may not embed into an image of video if it is too long.
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sizes are large. The goal of the proposed code is to have the codeword length grow
slower than existing codes, when all parameters except the coalition size is constant.
The novel Joint Source Fingerprinting paradigm, constituting the second ma-
jor contribution of this thesis will develop a framework that integrates all the steps
presented above into one design step, and at the same time oﬀer a new feature to
deter the collusion process. A suboptimal algorithm for video ﬁngerprinting is to be
designed, such that the algorithm is robust to collusion from small coalition sizes.
The design should be resilient to the following collusion attacks:
(1) Average attack from Equation 2.10;
(2) Random attack from Equation 2.9;
(3) Order Statistic attacks from Equations 2.11 to 2.16.
The algorithm should be resilient to the following single-user attacks:
(1) AWGN from Equation 2.1;
(2) JPEG compression;
(3) Small rotations;
(4) Translation of random blocks.
When collusion attacks are applied to a video that is ﬁngerprinted using the proposed
algorithm, the attacked video should exhibit visual degradation, which is in contrast to
existing ﬁngerprinting schemes, speciﬁcally those that are watermarked in the manner
of [1, 22, 8]. In addition, the proposed algorithm should exhibit qualities that lend
itself to eﬃcient broadcasting under the assumptions stated earlier. Speciﬁcally, the
proposed algorithm should be superior to [8, 11] in terms of bandwidth eﬃciency.
22
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
The ﬁngerprinting schemes discussed in this thesis are known as symmetric ﬁnger-
printing. In symmetric ﬁngerprinting, the buyer has no protection against a dishon-
est merchant whose intent is to frame the innocent buyer. This problem led to a
solution known as asymmetric ﬁngerprinting [23], allowing the buyer to avoid being
framed by dishonest merchants. The major drawback in that scheme is the amount
of personal information that the buyer needs to disclose to merchants. The solution
to this problem is known as anonymous ﬁngerprinting [24], where there is a third
party devoted to collecting and keeping personal information private. These two ﬁn-
gerprinting schemes are protocol-heavy, and some existing symmetric ﬁngerprinting
schemes can be modiﬁed to adopt these protocols, hence inheriting their frame-proof
and privacy advantages. The next section gives a summary of symmetric multimedia
ﬁngerprinting techniques to show the interrelationship of these works to the goal of
the thesis.
A. Classiﬁcation of Multimedia Fingerprinting
Symmetric ﬁngerprinting can be classiﬁed by how the ﬁngerprint is embedded. Figure
6 shows some existing ﬁngerprinting techniques.
The majority of symmetric ﬁngerprinting schemes embed the ﬁngerprint imper-
ceptibly into the content, and in Figure 6, this is categorized as Fingerprinting Using
Codebooks and Watermarking, which is also presented in the Problem Formulation
chapter. Methods for embedding a ﬁngerprint codeword into multimedia can be found
in the watermarking literature [1, 22, 8, 25, 16, 16, 26]. Within the realm of Finger-
printing using Codebooks and Watermarking, some works focus on the ﬁngerprinting
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codebook itself, with little reference to embedding, while others focus more on em-
bedding, as well as advanced watermark detection, as in the works of [26]. Within
the codebook research community, diﬀerent emphasis is placed on criteria such as
attack assumptions, coalition size, growth in probability of error, growth in codeword
length, ability to trace one or all pirates, etc. Most researchers only concentrate on
one of these criteria. For example, historically, many papers have been written on
ﬁngerprinting codes that are only secure against a coalition size of 2 or 3 pirates, such
as [9, 6, 27]. Even in a more recent paper [19], much emphasis is given to collusion-
resistance against 2 pirates. In this thesis, emphasis will be placed on coalitions of
much larger sizes, such as some non-negligible percentage of the total number of users.
Some ﬁngerprinting schemes, such as [28, 29], do not embed the ﬁngerprint in
the actual content, and the ﬁngerprint is really a unique key for applications such
as pay-TV decryption. In Figure 6, this is categorized as Key-based Fingerprinting.
Most Key-based Fingerprinting schemes aim to create codes that are resilient to at
most narrow-sense attacks; that is, erasure of detectable marks is not allowed, and
also mapping any detectable bit to alphabets not in that particular bit position is
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prohibited. Since the code is really a key, this makes sense, as erased bits would
prove useless in a key. These codes are called traceability codes (the term Tracing
Traitors is often found in the title of such works), and can be found in [28, 30, 31].
In [10] traceability codes are extended to allow a set number of erasures, by using the
Guruswami-Sudan soft-decision decoder. However the number of allowed erasures is
usually not enough to make the code resilient to extended narrow-sense attacks, as
will be shown by this thesis. In addition, this thesis will oﬀer an alternative way
to extend traceability codes in such a way that the resulting code is resilient to the
extended narrow-sense attack.
In [29], the system embeds one copyright watermark in all copies, and a unique
key is embedded in the users’ media player. The assumption is that the watermarked
video can only be played in the proprietary player, which checks the unique user
key with the embedded watermark to see if the user has rights to the content. If a
malicious user is able to obtain his unique key from the media player, he can remove
part of the watermark corresponding to his player, hence fooling his media player
into thinking that there is no copyright watermark in the video. However, since only
part of the watermark is removed, the missing part provides information that can be
used to trace the malicious user, i.e. the partial watermark becomes a ﬁngerprint.
To break this system, the video is either converted to another format and played
with another player that does not check for this watermark, or the malicious user can
record the video from the information being sent to his video card, thus avoiding the
media player altogether.
As noted earlier, the communication network can actively participate in ﬁnger-
printing, by selectively dropping packets, such that the resulting sequence of packets
at one user’s receiver diﬀers from the sequence of packets at other users’ receivers.
This uniqueness can be used to trace a malicious user who illegally re-distributes his
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media. Such schemes can be found in [13, 14], and are referred to as Active Network
Multicast Fingerprinting in Figure 6.
Early works on ﬁngerprinting did not make use of the media itself, but instead
embedded ﬁngerprints in the binary source, i.e. the bit representation of the media.
The main drawback with this method is that random perturbation of the binary
source can easily result in visual or audio degradation. In addition, perturbation of
bits that are safe against degradation, such as the least signiﬁcant bits, can easily be
removed by an adversary, since these bit locations are known to be safe against any
perturbations, including malicious ones. The lack of integration of the ﬁngerprinting
code with the media content itself, made this method of ﬁngerprinting, termed Non-
perceptual Embedding in Binary Source in Figure 6, obsolete very quickly. Works
such as [19, 12] adhere to this method of ﬁngerprinting. Although this method of
embedding is weak, insight on code design can be drawn from these works, and hence
they are reviewed in this paper.
Finally the Joint Source Fingerprinting paradigm will be introduced in this the-
sis. This concept is fundamentally diﬀerent from existing ﬁngerprinting techniques,
in that there is a higher integration of the ﬁngerprinting codes with the media. In
fact, the source media itself is used as the codebook alphabet, instead of creating a
codebook from independent alphabets not related to the source.
The proceeding sections will delve into speciﬁc instances of codebook design
in symmetric ﬁngerprinting. The emphasis is in showing a trend in ﬁngerprinting
codebook research; that is, the beginning of ﬁngerprinting research started with codes
generated randomly, progressed to codes that have deterministic structure, and ﬁnally
led to the present day concatenated codes that incorporate structure and randomness,
along with error-correcting capabilities.
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B. Limitations of Digital Fingerprinting
It is no surprise that with a suﬃcient number of colluders, any ﬁngerprinting scheme
can be defeated. For example, in [32], it was shown that with Ω(
√
n lnm) ﬁngerprinted
copies, where there are m copies containing unique i.i.d. Gaussian watermarks of
length n, colluders can successfully erase the ﬁngerprints. In many cases, there is an
upper bound on the number of colluders that can be handled by a collusion-resistant
code, before the ﬁngerprints can be erased. However, these ﬁndings do not suggest
that the ﬁngerprinting research exists in vein. For example, in [4, 20], group-based
construction of collusion-resistant codes is used to group buyers suspected of being
more likely to collude with one another. The goal of ﬁngerprinting research is to deter,
but not to prevent pirates who spend more time and money to erase the ﬁngerprints.
C. Random Codes
1. Chameleon Cipher
In an attempt to merge ﬁngerprinting and decryption to satisfy the broadcasting
requirements of Section B also depicted in Figure 3, the Chameleon Cipher was in-
troduced [12]. In this section, the coding method is studied, and ideas from this work
are later used to propose a novel ﬁngerprinting code in Chapter IV.
The Chameleon cipher is collusion-resistant to a coalition size of at most 4 pirates.
The code is generated randomly, and the idea is that any two users are expected to
have at least one bit in common, and these common bits will be unique to each pair
of users. Hence, when a coalition of 2 pirates colludes, and abides by the Marking
Assumption, these common bits will uniquely identify the pirates. When 3 pirates
collude, and employ the majority attack (Equation 2.8), common bits between each
pair of users will again leave a traceable trail. Even when 4 pirates collude, and
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employ a random attack (Equation 2.9), these common bits will remain with high
probability. Therefore, it is the common bits between pairs of users that identify
pirates in this scheme.
The next section presents codes that have structure, such that the shortcomings
of randomness are alleviated.
D. Structured Codes
The concept of having common bits between some codewords, but not others, as
introduced by the Chameleon Cipher in the previous section, is exploited in structured
codes. The diﬀerence between the structured codes presented in this section, and the
Chameleon Cipher, is that structured codes explicitly introduce common bits between
diﬀerent codewords, as opposed to relying on randomness to achieve this.
1. Fingerprinting Long Forgiving Messages
In [33], unique common bits between unique coalitions deﬁne the recipe for creating
ﬁngerprinting codes. Let N be the number of bits in the media, in which the ﬁn-
gerprints are to be embedded. For all subsets A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, |A| ≤ k, choose a
subset S(A) ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}, such that Equation 3.1 is satisﬁed.
A = B =⇒ S(A) ∩ S(B) = ∅ (3.1)
Then the ﬁngerprints Fi are formed according to Equation 3.2.
Fi(j) =
∑
i∈A
χS(A)(j) (3.2)
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for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and χS(A)(j) is the characteristic function:
χS(A)(j) =
 1 if j ∈ S(A)0 if j /∈ S(A) (3.3)
The ﬁngerprints are then added bit-wise to the media C, resulting in C˜i = C + Fi,
where C˜i, C, Fi are all in bit representation form.
1
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Fig. 7. Example of Fingerprinting Code Construction
Figure 7 depicts an example of the ﬁngerprint code construction. Suppose there
are M users with codewords represented by each of the M rows. Let A = {1, 4,M}
and B = {1, 3, 5}, so A = B (i.e. two disjoint coalitions). Let S(A) = {2, 4, N}
(crosses) and S(B) = {3, N − 1} (stars), so S(A) ∩ S(B) = ∅ (i.e. the bit positions
are disjoint). The crosses and stars represent 1’s in the ﬁngerprint codeword. Note
that the bits in the same bit position (i.e. same column) that are not crosses nor
stars, are explicitly set to 0’s.
If a majority attack (Equation 2.8) occurs between users 1, 3, 5, then bits 3, and
N−1 will remain as 1. The fact that both bits 3, N−1 are 1’s can be used to identify
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the culprits. However, bits 2, 4, l can also be set to be 1’s. In this case, user 1 can be
identiﬁed with conﬁdence as a culprit, but there would be confusion as to whether
users 1, 4,M are culprits or not. The shortcomings of this ﬁngerprinting construction
are:
(1) The ﬁngerprint is embedded via XOR with the binary representation of the
multimedia, and hence this may cause visual distortion if certain bits in the
multimedia are altered.
(2) As noted in [33], the ﬁngerprint codeword length grows exponentially in the
maximum size of the coalition, and hence the coalition size must be relatively
small.
2. Projective Geometric Codes
In [8], a ﬁngerprint is a collection of marking positions that are either marked with 1,
or not marked, being equivalent to 0. The idea is to construct ﬁngerprint codewords
that "intersect" with other ﬁngerprint codewords in unique ways. Assuming that the
unique intersections between unique coalitions of pirates cannot be changed, as in the
Marking Assumption, these unique intersections will determine all the colluders.
The concept of unique intersections has a nice geometric interpretation. For
ﬁngerprinting codes that can detect at most 2 colluders, the codewords that make
up Γ can be represented by the edges on the triangle in Figure 8. Any two users
have a unique intersection at the vertices of the triangle. If the pair of users remove
their detectable marks on the edge of the triangle, the intersection will remain intact,
revealing the identities of the 2 colluders. If the colluders do not remove all the
detectable marks, i.e. there is some leftover edge, then the leftover edge can be used
to trace the colluders as well. Hence it is in the best interest of colluders to remove
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Fig. 8. Geometric Interpretation of 2-collusion-resistant Codewords
detectable marks.
A possible attack that can cripple this system, is to remove the edges, but leave
all vertices intact. However, if the codeword is modulated and watermarked into the
media using a secret key, the attackers do not know where the verticies and edges are,
hence they can only guess. As will be seen later, when the geometric shapes reside
in higher dimensions, it will be more diﬃcult for the colluders to identify the vertices
and edges.
Figure 9 depicts a tetrahedron, where the 4 sides represent the codewords for 4
users that can trace at most 3 colluders. When 2 users collude, they share a unique
edge. When 3 users collude, they share a unique vertex.
For codewords that can detect at most 4 colluders, a geometric shape in 4-
dimensions is used. In general, codewords that can detect at most n colluders,
require shapes in n-dimensions. The hyperplanes of the higher-dimension "hyper-
tetrahedron", represents the codewords. These geometric shapes are coded using the
theory of projective geometry, and the details can be found in [34, 35]. The main
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Fig. 9. Geometric Interpretation of 3-collusion-resistant Codewords
shortcoming of this approach is that the length of the codewords is O(M c) bits, where
M is the total number of codewords (i.e. total number of users), and c is the maximum
coalition size that can be supported.
3. Balanced Incomplete Block Design Codes
The idea of using the unique intersection of codes to determine colluders is also used
in [36, 4, 26]. Instead of taking a geometric approach, Γ is designed using balanced
32
incomplete block design (BIBD) from combinatorial design theory [37, 38, 39]. One
of the drawbacks of the BIBD codes is that they are only resilient to the binary
AND operator. That is, when a coalition applies the binary AND operation to their
codewords, the resulting word will diﬀer from a word created from a diﬀerent set of
words. Therefore, diﬀerent attacked words will "intersect" at diﬀerent bit positions
when the attack is the AND operation. However, under other collusion attacks, this
scheme cannot be used to trace pirates.
Another drawback of using the BIBD code, is that they do not exist for any
arbitrary number of users M , and coalition size c. If a symmetric (l, c, λ) BIBD code
exists, M = λ l
2−l
c2−c users are supported, with coalition size at most c−1. Furthermore,
the length of each codeword is l, so the length is approximately O(c
√
M) bits. The
conditions on the existence of BIBD-codes can be found in [37, 38, 39].
Although the codeword length is much shorter than those of the codes previously
reviewed, the shortcoming of the BIBD codes is that they are only robust to the AND
operator.
E. Concatenated Codes
The latest trend in ﬁngerprinting codes is the use of concatenated codes. The idea
behind concatenated codes is that codes that are weak1 can be reinforced by using
an error correcting code. The method by which ﬁngerprinting codes and error cor-
recting codes are combined is called concatenation. Concatenated codes are deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 16.
Definition 16 (Concatenated Codes) Let V be a codebook of size q. Let W be a
1This weakness can be the lack of robustness to collusion attacks, or the lack of
robustness to larger coalitions [3], as well as an unacceptable probability of error [19].
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q-ary code. Then a (V,W ) concatenated code is the following
{ϕ(w1)ϕ(w2) · · ·ϕ(wl) | wi ∈W, ϕ : W → V } (3.4)
and ϕ is a one-to-one correspondence.
Two works use concatenated codes to achieve shorter ﬁngerprinting codeword lengths,
and at the same time maintain a small probability of error.
1. Fingerprinting Under the Marking Assumption
The construction of ﬁngerprinting codes in [3] is fundamentally diﬀerent from those
codes previously reviewed, in that unique intersections are not used to identify pirates,
but rather, the distribution of bits in the attacked word is used.
The codebook design is now described. Let |Γ| = M , and construct the M ×
(M − 1) matrix: 
1 1 1 · · · 1
0 1 1 · · · 1
0 0 1 · · · 1
0 0 0 · · · ...
...
...
...
. . . 1
0 0 0 0 0

Each column is replicated d = 2M2 log(2M/) times, where  denotes a user-deﬁned
probability of error. After each column is replicated d times, a random permutation
of the columns of the matrix is then performed. The M rows of this resulting matrix
make up the codewords in Γ, and are assigned to M diﬀerent users. The code is able
to resist collusion up to M users.
The tracing algorithm is now described. Suppose η is the word created from a
collusion attack. Let Bm be the m
th block of d bits from the unpermuted η (that is
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the reverse permutation from the construction of Γ is applied), where the Bm’s are
non-overlapping. Let Rs = Bs−1Bs for s ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n − 1}. Let weight(x) be the
number of 1’s in x, where x is a word made up of bits. The tracing algorithm A, is
then:
(1) If weight(B1) > 0 then output "User 1 is guilty".
(2) If weight(Bn−1) < d then output "User n is guilty".
(3) For all s = 2 to n− 1 do:
Let k = weight(Rs).
If weight(Bs−1) < k2 −
√
k
2
log 2n

then output "User s is guilty".
In addition, the unreadable marks are set to 0.
It can be seen from the tracing algorithm that the distribution of 1’s in the
attacked word is used to determine the pirates. This is fundamentally diﬀerent from
the tracing algorithm in the works previous reviewed, because the tracing algorithm
in those works used ﬁxed common bits to identify the pirates.
The concept of concatenating ﬁngerprinting codes is used by [3] to shorten the
length of their ﬁngerprinting codes, but at the same time robustness to larger coalition
sizes is sacriﬁced. Here, the inner code V is the c-collusion-resistant code previously
presented. The outer code W consists of codewords generated randomly with uniform
distribution. The tracing algorithm for this concatenated code can be found in [3].
The length of this code is
l = O
(
c4 log
(
M

)
log
(
1

))
(3.5)
where c is the maximum coalition size, M is the total number of users supported, and
 is the probability of error.
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2. Separating Codes
In the concatenated ﬁngerprinting code of [19], the inner code V is a (c, c)-separating
code, and the outer code W is a (N,K,∆ = δN) linear code.
Definition 17 ((t, t′)-separating Code) A code V is a (t, t′)-separating code when
for X ⊂ V , Y ⊂ V , |X| = t, |Y | = t′ the following holds:
X ∩ Y = ∅ =⇒ e(X) ∩ e(Y ) = ∅ (3.6)
where e is the narrow-sense envelope.
Equation 3.6 is a weaker condition than the condition of 0-error collusion-resistance
given in Equation 2.7. For example, the condition of being pair-wise disjoint is less
stringent than being disjoint for more than two sets. Therefore an outer code is
needed to fortify separating codes.
The probability of error bound as given by [19], is reproduced in Equation 3.7.
 ≤ 2−nR(V )((log2 q)−1D(σ‖ c−1q−1)−R(W )) (3.7)
Here V is a (c, c)-separating binary (m, q) code, where q = |V |, m is the length of a
codeword in V , and R(V ) = log2(q)
m
is the rate of V ; W is a (N,K,∆ = δN) linear
error code, R(W ) = K
N
is the rate of W ;
δ > 1− 1
c2
+
c− 1
c(q − 1) ,
σ =
1
c
− (1− δ)c;
D
(
σ‖ c−1
q−1
)
is the relative entropy deﬁned as
D(σ‖p) = σ log2
(
σ
p
)
+ (1− σ) log2
(
1− σ
1− p
)
;
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ﬁnally the entire code is of length n = mN , supporting up to qK users, and being
robust to coalitions of up to size c. The length of the code is approximately given by
Equation 3.8, which is derived in Appendix B.
l = O
(
2c log2(M) log2
(
M

))
(3.8)
The next section describes a simple broadcasting scheme that operates under the
assumptions described earlier.
F. A Simple Broadcasting Scheme
Most of the broadcasting schemes in the literature do not meet the assumptions in
Section B. Many of them use more than one channel, or use some multicast scheme.
In this section, one broadcasting scheme from [3, 40] that ﬁts the requirements of
Section B is presented.
A plaintext object P of length L, is partitioned into l pieces. These l pieces are
then replicated so that there are two copies of the l pieces. The ﬁrst l pieces are
embedded with a 0 using some watermarking technique, and the second set of the
l pieces is embedded with a 1. Each of the 2l pieces is encrypted with 2l distinct
keys. Each user then receives all 2l pieces, but only l keys that can decrypt one of the
two pairs. The l keys that are distributed to users correspond to a binary ﬁngerprint
codeword, hence if collusion of keys occurs, the resulting output is traceable. Figure
10 depicts the process of partitioning, embedding, and encrypting. This broadcasting
scheme requires the transmission of 2 times the size of the original object; that is
the size of transmission is 2L, so the transmission size is O(1) with respect to the
number of users M , that the copies will be distributed to. In a traditional many-to-
many distribution where every unique user receives a unique copy, the transmission
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Fig. 10. Distribution of Encrypted Data - A Broadcast Channel Approach
bandwidth grows linearly with the number of users; that is the size of transmission
is M × L for M users, so the transmission size is O(M).
The following chapter introduces a novel ﬁngerprinting code that uses common
bits between codewords, as well as the bit distribution in the attacked word, to trace
pirates. In addition, concatenation is used, but the roles of the inner and outer codes
are reversed. In essence, the ideas from the works reviewed earlier are all integrated
to give rise to this new ﬁngerprinting code. It will be shown that this novel scheme
can be used to improve the robustness of weak codes, such as the code found in a
recent paper [4].
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CHAPTER IV
A NOVEL FINGERPRINTING CODE
In the works of [12, 33, 8, 4] common bits between sets of codewords are used to trace
pirates. In the concatenated ﬁngerprinting codes of [3, 19], the inner code has some
type of weak collusion-resisting capability, while the outer code is an error-control
code. In this chapter, a novel ﬁngerprinting code design that uses both common
bits and concatenation is presented. The roles in concatenation are reversed, such
that the inner code is an error-control code, while the outer code has some type of
collusion-resisting capability. The resulting code is then merged with a traceability
code to achieve robustness against narrow-sense attacks. The spirit of this work is
that weak codes can be combined and result in stronger codes.
A. Step 1: The Outer Code
The code design ﬁrst starts with a code that is only robust to the hard extended
attack, whose envelope is given by Deﬁnition 18.
Definition 18 (Hard Extended Envelope) The Hard Extended Envelope of a code-
book Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γM} ⊂ Σl, is the set
Eh∗(Γ, h) = {x1x2 · · ·xl | (γ1i = γ2i = · · · γMi =⇒ xi = γi)∧(∃j, k γji = γki =⇒ xi = h)}
(4.1)
where h ∈ Σ ∪ {∗ | ∗ /∈ Σ} is ﬁxed.
Indeed Eh∗(Γ, h) ⊂ E∗(Γ) for h ∈ Σ∪{∗|∗ /∈ Σ}, so Deﬁnition 18 is a more restrictive
attack than the extended wide-sense attack. Essentially, pirates always replace a
detectable alphabet with a ﬁxed symbol h.
The following lemma is implicitly used by the tracing algorithms in [12, 33, 8, 4].
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Lemma 1 ∀ Γ′,Γ′′ ⊂ Γ, |Γ′| ≤ c, |Γ′′| ≤ c
Γ′ = Γ′′ =⇒ Z(Γ′) = Z(Γ′′) (4.2)
when Z(Γ) ∈ Eh∗(Γ, h) for a ﬁxed h is a suﬃcient condition for c-collusion-resistance
as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.
Proof 1 Since every unique coalition of colluders maps to another unique attacked
codeword, the function Z is injective. Therefore the image of any Γ′ can always be
mapped back to its unique pre-image Γ′. The tracing algorithm thus maps Z(Γ′) back
to A(Z(Γ′)) = Γ′. The probability of error is thus 0, and hence
Pr[A(Z(Γ′)) ∈ P(Γ′) {∅}] = 1
satisfying Deﬁnition 4.

Lemma 1 is analogous to the idea of achieving the information channel capacity for the
noisy typewriter [41]. Figure 11a shows a noisy typewriter. There is some probability
that given A was sent, the receiver receives either A or B with equal probability.
Each alphabet has a possible chance of being confused with its increasing adjacent
alphabet. To achieve information channel capacity, that is maximum transmission
with low error, only a subset of the inputs are used as shown in Figure Figure 11b.
The channel then becomes injective or one-to-one, and the receiver can always decide
which alphabet was sent. This is the exact idea adopted in Lemma 1; by designing
codebooks with codewords such that their attacked counterpart does not coincide, the
tracing algorithm can always decide which codewords were sent. However, Lemma 1
is not achievable with any attack Z, and hence it is only stated for the hard extended
attack.
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The codes in [4, 36] do in fact satisfy Lemma 1 for h = 0, but not h = 1 . For
example, a code given in [4, 36] is
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1

where each row represents a codeword. Under the hard extended envelope Eh∗(Γ, 1),
Z({γ1, γ2}) = Z({γ1, γ4}), however {γ1, γ2} = {γ1, γ4}, therefore Equation 4.2 is not
satisﬁed. The next step is to extend this code such that it is robust to the hard
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extended attack for h = 1.
The following lemma describes a means to improve the robustness of codes that
are only robust against one ﬁxed symbol in the hard extended attack.
Lemma 2 For the binary alphabet Σ = {0, 1}, let Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γM} be a codebook
that satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for one h, that is either h = 0, or h = 1, but not both.
Then
(1) Γ also satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for h = ∗.
(2) Let Γ& = {γγ | γ ∈ Γ}, where γ is the bit complement of γ. Then Γ& satisﬁes
Equation 4.2 for Eh∗(Γ&, 0) ∪ Eh∗(Γ&, 1) ∪ Eh∗(Γ&, ∗).
Proof 2 Suppose without loss of generality that Γ satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for h = 0,
but not h = 1. The words in Eh∗(Γ, 0) uniquely identify unique coalitions. If any
of the 0’s in theses words are replaced by ∗, the words are still unique, since the
distribution of the 1’s is untouched and hence still unique. Therefore Γ also satisﬁes
Equation 4.2 for h = ∗.
If Γ satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for h = 0, then Γ = {γ | γ ∈ Γ} satisﬁes Equation
4.2 for h = 1, since 0 = 1. For γ′ ∈ Γ&, if Z(γ′) ∈ Eh∗(Γ&, 0), the ﬁrst half of
Z(γ′) will be unique for unique coalitions, therefore the entire Z(γ′) will be unique
for unique coalitions. On the other hand, if Z(γ′) ∈ Eh∗(Γ&, 1), then the second half
of Z(γ′) will be unique for unique coalitions, therefore the entire Z(γ′) will be unique
for unique coalitions. Finally, if Z(γ′) ∈ Eh∗(Γ&, ∗), the same argument applies,
using the ﬁrst part of this proof.

Lemma 2 gives a technique for extending existing binary codes that only satisfy
Equation 4.2 for one ﬁxed h. For example, the code in [4, 36] can be extended to
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satisfy Equation 4.2 for h = ∗ and h = 1. The length is only increased by a factor of
2, which does not aﬀect the asymptotic upper-bound length. For example the code in
[4, 36] has length O(c
√
M). Applying Lemma 2, the length is O(2c
√
M) = O(c
√
M).
Next, another code that is robust against the hard extended attack for ﬁxed symbol
h = 1 is presented.
In [4, 36], the trivial code against AND attacks of maximum coalition size M ,
where |Γ| = M , is presented. Here the code will be called the identity code, and it
satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for h = 1.
Definition 19 (Identity Code) Let IM be a M × M identity matrix. Then the
rows in IM make up the codewords in Γ, and Γ is called the identity codebook or code.
Lemma 3 The identity code satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for h = 1.
Proof 3 Suppose any two diﬀerent arbitrary sized coalitions Γ′,Γ′′ ⊂ Γ are chosen.
Since Γ′ = Γ′′, ∃γi ∈ Γ′ such that γi /∈ Γ′′ or ∃γi ∈ Γ′′ such that γi /∈ Γ′. Recalling
that every codeword in Γ has exactly one 1 at a unique position, let γik = 1; that is,
the kth bit is the unique 1 in γi. Then Z(Γ′)k = 1 but Z(Γ′′)k = 0 or Z(Γ′′)k = 1 but
Z(Γ′)k = 0. Therefore Z(Γ′) = Z(Γ′′).

The identity code has codeword length l = O(M), however it is robust against coali-
tion sizes of up to M , whereas the l = O(c
√
M) codes in [4, 36] are robust against
coalition sizes of c ≤M .
Corollary 1 A codebook Γ with M codewords from the rows of the matrix [IM I¯M ]
satisﬁes Equation 4.2 for the envelope Eh∗(Γ, 0) ∪ Eh∗(Γ, 1) ∪ Eh∗(Γ, ∗).
Corollary 1 follows from Lemma 2 and 3.
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B. Step 2: The Inner Error-Detecting Code
The goal now is to make the code in Lemma 1 even more robust, in particular to
the random attack that conforms to the Marking Assumption. The main idea behind
achieving this level of robustness is to introduce error-detecting codes, which will be
used as an inner code.
Theorem 1 Given a codebook Γ ⊆ {0, 1}l of cardinality M that is c-collusion-resistant
with respect to the envelope Eh∗(Γ, 0) ∪ Eh∗(Γ, 1) ∪ Eh∗(Γ, ∗), a codebook Γ(C) can
be created from Γ using error-detection codes C in place of the binary alphabet, such
that Γ is the outer code, and C is the inner code, to achieve:
(1) Robustness against random attacks that conform to the Marking Assumption,
such that a detectable bit behaves as though it were being transmitted across the
binary random channel in Figure 12 with p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
(2) The probability of error  can be controlled by the error-detecting code.
Proof 4 Let C = {c0, c1} be a binary error-detecting code. For each codeword in Γ,
map 0 → c0 and 1 → c1. The attack strategy under the envelopes Eh∗(Γe, 0) and
Eh∗(Γe, 1) is taken care of by the fact that Γ is originally immune to such attacks,
so assume the attacker randomly chooses 0, 1, or the erasure symbol ∗ with non-zero
probability for detectable bits.
The tracing algorithm will act on the error-detecting blocks in the word η ∈
E∗(Γe). Each block that is detected to be in error will be replaced by ∗, while blocks
that are not in error are mapped back, c0 → 0 and c1 → 1. This creates a word
ηˆ ∈ Eh∗(Γ, ∗), therefore a unique coalition can be identiﬁed.
This random attack, acts as random noise on the error-detecting blocks. Suppose
C has a probability of failing to detect an error given by ′. Then in the most fatal
44
0
1
*
p1
p2
p3
Detectable Bit
p1 + p2 + p3 = 1
Fig. 12. The Binary Random Channel
case, missing one undetected error will cause ηˆ /∈ Eh∗(Γ, ∗), and hence ηˆ cannot be
used to trace the pirates. The probability of being able to trace (i.e. ηˆ ∈ Eh∗(Γ, ∗)) in
this case would be (1− ′)l. Hence the probability of error (i.e. ηˆ /∈ Eh∗(Γ, ∗)) of the
entire scheme is bounded by  ≤ 1− (1− ′)l.

Theorem 1 and its proof provide a technique for designing ﬁngerprinting codes
that are resilient against the attack in Figure 12. Usually the pirate will set p2 = 0,
degenerating Figure 12 into the binary symmetric channel, because the erasure symbol
∗ incriminates the pirates more easily.
The subsections below summarize the construction and tracing algorithm.
1. Construction
(1) Design a code G that is c-collusion-resistant to attacks that have envelopes of
either Eh∗(G, 0) or Eh∗(G, 1).
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(2) Create the code Γ = G& as outlined in Lemma 2.
(3) Design an error correcting code C = {c0, c1}.
(4) Create the concatenated code (see Deﬁnition 16 as well as proof of Theorem 1)
with Γ = G& as the outer code, and C as the inner code.
2. Tracing Algorithm
Suppose the attacked word is η.
(1) Break η up into non-overlapping blocks {y1y2 · · · yl}, such that the length of yi
is equal to the length of c0 or c1.
(2) For each yi, use the error-detecting algorithm of C to determine if yi is in error.
If yi is in error, let ηˆi = ∗, otherwise let ηˆi = 0 if yi = c0, and ηˆi = 1 if yi = c1.
(3) If ηˆ = ηˆ1ηˆ2 · · · ηˆl ∈ Eh∗(Γ, ∗), then ηˆ uniquely identiﬁes all pirates.
3. Example of Concatenating an Outer and an Inner Code
In this section, an example of an outer identity code and an inner binary repetition
code is provided to illustrate the construction given above. The binary repetition
code of length n is given by Deﬁnition 20.
Definition 20 (Binary Repetition Code) C =
{
00 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, 11 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
}
is a (n, 1) lin-
ear code called the binary repetition code of length n.
Corollary 2 gives a probability of error bound.
Corollary 2 Let W be any binary c-collusion-resistant codebook with codewords of
length l that is immune to attacks with the attack envelope Eh∗(W, 0) ∪ Eh∗(W, 1) ∪
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Eh∗(W, ∗), and let V be the binary repetition code of size n. Construct the ﬁnger-
printing code with outer code W , inner binary repetition code V . Suppose the attacker
randomly chooses 0, 1, or ∗ when the bit is detectable. Then the probability of error
is bounded by Equation 4.3.
 ≤ 1−
(
1− 1
2n
)l
≈ l
2n
(4.3)
Proof 5 Corollary 2 follows from Theorem 1 by noting that ′ = 1
2n
for the binary
repetition code. For small 1
2n
, applying a binomial expansion on the term
(
1− 1
2n
)l
,
and keeping the ﬁrst two terms, results in the approximation l
2n
.
As an example of using Corollary 2, the codebook consisting of rows from [IM , I¯M ]
from Corollary 1 is used as the outer code, so then length of the outer code is 2M .
The binary repetition code of size n is used as the inner code, so the inner code is
of length n. In addition,  ≤ 2M
2n
, so n ≤ log2
(
2M

)
. Therefore the total length of
codewords of this concatenated code is l = 2Mn ≤ 2M log2
(
2M

)
= O(M log2
(
M

)
).
C. Step 3: Mixing with Traceability Codes
As mentioned earlier, traceability codes are only resilient against the narrow-sense
collusion attack. In this section, a technique is presented that merges traceability
codes with the codes introduced in the previous section, allowing the combined code
to be resilient to the extended narrow-sense attack.
From [30], traceability codes are deﬁned in Deﬁnition 21.
Definition 21 (Traceability Codes) A code Γ is a c-TA (traceability) code if for
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all coalitions Γ′ ⊂ Γ with |Γ′| ≤ c, if η ∈ e(Γ′), then ∃γ ∈ Γ′ such that
|{i | γi = ηi}| > |{i | zi = ηi}|
∀z ∈ Γ \ Γ′.
Deﬁnition 21 states that whenever a coalition of pirates colludes to produce a word
η, there will be a codeword from the coalition that is closer to η (in the Hamming
distance) than any codeword not part of the coalition. From this deﬁnition, it can
be seen that the tracing algorithm is based on ﬁnding the closest codeword to the
attacked word η in the Hamming distance sense. What is interesting to note, is
that the code developed in the previous section has the opposite eﬀect; any erasure of
detectable bits for the code developed in the previous section will strongly incriminate
the pirates, whereas in traceability codes, erasure is not tolerated, because erasure
causes the attacked word to be further in Hamming distance from the codewords
owned by the coalition, thus defeating the c-TA tracing algorithm. This insight
suggests that there is some way to merge the two codes, thus allowing the resulting
code to be robust against the extended narrow-sense attack.1
In [30], the following theorem is given that gives the tracing algorithm as well as
the required length of c-TA codes.
Theorem 2 Let Γ be a code with codewords that are of length n, c is a positive
integer, and the minimum distance d of C satisﬁes d > n− n
c2
. Then
(1) C is a c-TA code;
(2) if Γ′ ⊂ Γ with |Γ′| ≤ c, and η ∈ e(Γ′), then
1In [10], c-TA codes are extended to allow for a ﬁxed number of erasures. However
the number of erasures allowed is not enough to make the code robust against the
extended narrow-sense attack as described in Appendix B.
48
(i) ∃γ ∈ Γ′, such that Hamming(η, γ) ≤ n− n
c
, and
(ii) ∀z ∈ Γ, if Hamming(η, z) ≤ n− n
c
, then z ∈ Γ′.
Theorem 2 also implies that there exists linear codes with length
n ≥ c2 log2(q)(logq(M)− 1) = c2 log2(M)− c2 log2(q)
bits, where where c is the maximum size of the coalition, M is the total number of
users supported, and q is the size of the alphabet (i.e. q = |Σ|). Minimum Distance
Separable (MDS) codes such as Reed-Solomon codes are often used in c-TA codes
[30, 31, 10], resulting in a length of exactly n = c2 log2(M) bits.
Now to extend the c-TA MDS code to tolerate erasures, adjoin to the c-TA MDS
code, the identity code IM (Deﬁnition 19), and repeat each column in the identity
code d× c2log2(M) times. Then randomly permute the columns of the code identity
and c-TA code, intermixing them, keeping the permutation secret from the users so
that the users do not know the locations of the identity code and the c-TA code.
When the pirates choose to erase one detectable bit, the probability that this bit
belongs to the c-TA code is bounded by Equation 4.5.
 ≤ c
2 log2(M)
c2 log2(M) + 2dc
2log2(M)
(4.4)
=
1
1 + 2d
(4.5)
Although the length of the combined c-TA and identity code is
c2 log2(M) +Mdc
2log2(M),
the denominator in Equation 4.4 is only c2 log2(M) + 2dc
2log2(M), because in the
worst case scenario, when only 2 pirates collude, only 2 bits from the identity code
are detectable. In fact, as more pirates collude, more bits from the identity code are
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detectable, and hence it is even more diﬃcult for the pirates to erase a detectable bit
from the c-TA code. In addition, if d is large enough, the more detectable bits the
pirates erase, the more likely these erased bits will fall into the identity code, which
will then incriminate the pirates as discussed in the previous section.
For any ﬁxed , d ≤ 1
2
(
1

− 1) by solving for d in Equation 4.5. Therefore the
entire length of the joint c-TA and identity code is given by Equation 4.6.
l ≤ c2 log2(M)
(
1 +
M
2
(
1

− 1
))
(4.6)
= O
(
c2

M log2(M)
)
(4.7)
This code is not asymptotically better than the code in [3], whose length is given by
Equation 3.5, when all the parameters c, M , and  are considered as independent
variables. However, it will be shown in the next section that when M is a function
of c, such that c is some ﬁxed percentage of M , and  is held constant, this code has
much shorter codeword length.
D. The Malicious Distributor
The ﬁngerprinting research has been active for more than 10 years, and as mentioned
earlier, there are several diﬀerent criteria used in comparing the performance of codes.
In this section, the performance criterion used in this work will ﬁrst be motivated,
and then it will be shown that the proposed code excels under this criterion.
In the classical collusion scenario, a small coalition of buyers with legitimate
copies compare their ﬁngerprinted copies and try to detect and remove their ﬁnger-
prints. This classical collusion scenario can either consist of a small group of people
meeting one another in person, on the Internet, or even one person purchasing a small
number of copies. In this scenario, it makes sense that the ﬁngerprinting codes are
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designed for a ﬁxed small number c, where c is the maximum allowed number of col-
luders. Indeed, the ﬁngerprinting schemes reviewed in this work have been designed
for such a scenario, as their codeword lengths vary exponentially with c [33, 8, 19],
or are exclusively designed for a small coalition size such as 2 or 3 [9, 6, 27, 19].
The second collusion scenario that has received little attention is that of a mali-
cious distributor. Suppose the broadcasting framework is such that there exists several
diﬀerent distributors (such as diﬀerent cable or satellite service providers). Each dis-
tributor receives some non-negligible percentage of the total number of ﬁngerprinted
media. A malicious distributor or perhaps a malicious employee who obtains a large
number of ﬁngerprinted media and applies collusion attacks, will defeat the tracing
algorithm when these codes have a ﬁxed c that is small. Upon removing the ﬁnger-
prints via large-scale collusion, the malicious distributor might then illegally sell the
untraceable media to generate additional income.
In general, the codeword length is a function of (M, c, ), which represent the
total number of users supported, the maximum coalition size, and the probability of
error respectively. Under the malicious distributor scenario, (M, c) can be collapsed
into one parameter, because c is a ﬁxed percentage of M , and therefore M is a
function of c. For example, if c is 10% of M (i.e. M = 10c) then 10c can replace
the parameter M . In addition, the parameter  is usually ﬁxed and user-deﬁned
[3]. Therefore, under the malicious distributor scenario, the codeword length is only
a function of the variable c, which itself is a function of the number of distributors.
The interested reader is referred to Appendix C, which discusses how modulation and
watermarking can be used to prevent the exploitation of the structure of the code in
collusion attacks.
The following section will provide empirical results that demonstrate the supe-
riority of the codeword length of the proposed code under the malicious distributor
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scenario.
E. Comparison of Codes
Under the malicious distributor scenario, letM = νc for some constant ν, and suppose
 is ﬁxed, say to 10−5. Then the codeword length in [3] is O(c4 log2(c)), while the
codeword length of the proposed code is O(c3 log2(c)). Therefore under the malicious
distributor scenario, the proposed code is superior in codeword length. Figure 13
demonstrates that the length of the codewords for the proposed code is shorter than
the length of the codewords for the code in [3] when c is some percentage of M , and
 is ﬁxed at 10−5.
The other codes presented in this thesis are not plotted, because their codeword
lengths grow exponentially with c. A summary of the codes is provided in Table I,
outlining the strengths and weaknesses of each code.
52
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x 104
104
106
108
1010
1012
1014
1016
1018
1020
1022
Exact Codeword Lengths when Total Users is a Multiple of Coalition Size
M = Total Number of Users = v x Maximum Coalition Size allowed
Co
de
wo
rd
 L
en
gt
h 
(nu
mb
er 
of 
bit
s p
er 
co
de
wo
rd)
 lo
g−
sc
ale
Boneh−Shaw (c = 3% of M)
Proposed Code (c = 3% of M)
Boneh−Shaw (c = 6% of M)
Proposed Code (c = 6% of M)
Boneh−Shaw (c = 25% of M)
Proposed Code (c = 25% of M)
Fig. 13. Codeword Lengths for the Boneh-Shaw Code vs. the Proposed Code When
the Coalition Size Is a Percentage of the Total Number of Users and  Is Fixed
at 10−5
53
Table I. Comparison of Popular Fingerprinting Codes
Method  Robustness  Coalition 
Size 
Length in 
terms of 
coalition size 
c (other 
parameters 
constant)  
Number 
of Pirates  
Identified  
Probability 
of Error  
Major 
Drawback  
Projective 
Geometric  
Marking 
Assumption  
with 
erasure  
Small c Exponential in  
c 
All User-define d 
parameter  
Small 
codebooks 
(hence 
small 
coalition 
sizes). 
BIBD  Binary 
AND 
At most 
codeword 
length over 
the square 
root of  the 
total number 
of users  
Approximately 
square of c 
All 0 Only robust 
to binary 
AND 
operator . 
Boneh and 
Shaw 
concatenated 
code  
Marking 
Assumption  
with 
erasure  
Large c  Approximately 
4th  power in c  
One User-defined 
parameter  
For fixed 
probability 
of error, and 
number of 
users as a 
function of 
c, length is 
longer than 
proposed 
novel code . 
Separating 
concatenated 
code  
Marking 
Assumption  
with 
erasure  
Small c  Exponential 
for large c  
One At least 
decreasing 
exponentially 
in codeword 
length 
Not 
appropriate 
for large 
coalition s. 
Novel Code  Marking 
Assumption  
with 
erasure  
Large c Approximately 
cube of c  
At least 
one 
User-defined 
parameter  
For varying 
probability 
of error, 
number of 
users, and 
coalition 
size, length 
is longer 
than Boneh -
Shaw 
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CHAPTER V
JOINT SOURCE FINGERPRINTING - A NEW PARADIGM FOR
MULTIMEDIA FINGERPRINTING
This chapter introduces a new paradigm for multimedia ﬁngerprinting. The shortcom-
ings of the traditional paradigm for multimedia ﬁngerprinting are brieﬂy reviewed.
Motivated by a need to address these shortcomings, a new paradigm termed Joint
Source Fingerprinting is introduced. Insights into the new JSF paradigm are pre-
sented by comparing the new paradigm to existing research. An algorithm for video
ﬁngerprinting is then presented, along with simulation results to verify the theoretical
and empirical observations.
A. Shortcomings of Traditional Fingerprinting
In the traditional multi-step ﬁngerprinting paradigm, a codebook (set of codewords)
with collusion-resistant properties is designed independently of the media into which
the codewords are to be embedded. The codewords are then modulated and embedded
into the host media via watermarking techniques, resulting in uniquely ﬁngerprinted
media. A pirate can then obtain several uniquely ﬁngerprinted copies with the inten-
tion of either removing the ﬁngerprints, or scrambling the ﬁngerprints so as to frame
innocent users.
The shortcomings of this ﬁngerprinting approach are:
(1) The ﬁngerprint codewords are designed independently of the media, and only
merged with the media via a watermarking technique. Therefore this method of
"ﬁngerprinting using codebook and watermarking" is not specialized for mul-
timedia. In most cases, the codebook attacks are not representative of the
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multimedia collusion attacks, nor the single-user attacks discussed in Chapter
II (i.e. the Marking Assumption may be ignored by pirates).
(2) The codeword length required to support a large number of users may be too
long, hence the entire codeword may not "ﬁt" into the media using watermark-
ing techniques.
(3) As more pirates participate in collusion attacks, the ﬁngerprints become more
vulnerable to removal, yet the media itself does not suﬀer from visual degrada-
tion.
(4) The uniqueness requirement of ﬁngerprint codewords, conﬂicts with the require-
ments of statistical invisibility [42].
The ﬁrst shortcoming is prevalent in the ﬁngerprinting literature. For example,
attackers may not conform to the Marking Assumption by applying any sort of single-
user attack at their discretion.
The second shortcoming is based on the idea that every media has a watermarking
capacity, such that if the watermark to be embedded is larger than this capacity,
the resulting media either experiences visual distortion, or the watermark cannot be
reliably extracted [43, 44].
The third shortcoming states that a multimedia collusion attack does not aﬀect
the visual quality of multimedia such as images or videos. This statement is veriﬁed in
the simulation results later in this chapter. However, a collusion attack that nulliﬁes
the ﬁngerprints should also be required to result in visually degraded multimedia; that
is, colluders should be punished with visually degraded multimedia whenever collusion
attacks are employed. The spirit of punishing colluders with degraded media is also
found in [45]. In [45], images are ﬁngerprinted by applying a random geometric warp
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(rotation and translation). The geometric warp itself does not visually degrade the
image. However when uniquely ﬁngerprinted copies are averaged, the resulting image
appears blurry, and hence it is of little commercial value. In essence, an average
attack is punished with severe visual degradation. The shortcoming of [45] is that
it is easy to remove the ﬁngerprint via single-user attacks (i.e. further rotating and
translating of the image will confuse the tracing algorithm). As will be shown, the
JSF adopts this idea, but improves upon it by punishing single-user attacks as well
as collusion attacks.
Finally, [42] equates the inability to detect a watermark to that of statistical
invisibility, which is satisﬁed if and only if the correlation between two frames/images
is equal to the correlation between two watermarks that are to be embedded into
the two frames/images. When dealing with multimedia ﬁngerprinting using code-
book and watermarking, the two images are identical, and hence to achieve statistical
invisibility, the two ﬁngerprints have to be identical as well. This contradicts the
uniqueness requirements of ﬁngerprints, and at the same time suggests that ﬁnger-
printing using codebook and watermarking may not be appropriate for multimedia
ﬁngerprinting.
B. Joint Source Fingerprinting
This brief introduction gives the general idea behind the JSF paradigm. In the next
section, a mathematical description is provided to solidify the concepts presented
here.
The JSF paradigm integrates codebook design with the multimedia itself. That
is, the multimedia is used as the fundamental alphabet (i.e. Σ) of the codebook.
This approach is a signiﬁcant departure from the traditional approach, and paves the
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way for overcoming the ﬁrst shortcoming described above. The idea is to separate
the multimedia into two classes, termed the semantic class, and the feature class.
These two classes can contain elements from any transform of the multimedia, such
as the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), or the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT).
Each resulting ﬁngerprinted multimedia will include the semantic class, but diﬀerent
subsets of the feature class. These diﬀerent subsets of the feature class are called the
ﬁngerprints.
The semantic class is a coarse representation of the multimedia that gives enough
information to understand the semantic content of the multimedia, however it lacks
detail, and hence has no commercial value. Examples of semantic classes for images
are the edges of an image, the low-pass ﬁltered image, half an image (i.e. crop the
bottom half of the image, but keep the top half), or any other coarse representation
of an image.
The idea is that colluders can distinguish the ﬁngerprints amongst diﬀerent
copies, however completely removing the ﬁngerprints will result in the semantic class,
which has no commercial value. Hence this is a direction towards partially overcoming
the third shortcoming in the traditional approach.
Finally the ﬁngerprints should be diﬃcult to combine, and any computationally
simple combination of ﬁngerprints will either still incriminate at least one of the
colluders, or result in a visually degraded copy. For example, just mixing ﬁngerprints
from diﬀerent users will result in the identiﬁcation of all colluders whose ﬁngerprints
are part of this mix.
1. Mathematical Description of the Joint Source Fingerprinting Paradigm
The JSF paradigm is now deﬁned mathematically. As a ﬁrst step, visual entropy
is deﬁned in order to account for the Human Visual System (HVS), as this is the
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fundamental building block in image and video compression, watermarking, as well
as the JSF paradigm. For example, the HVS ignores many details in photographic
stills, and these ignored details are partially removed in compression algorithms, or
partially used to hide watermarks1.
Definition 22 (Visual Entropy) Let C be a random vector representing some mul-
timedia content. Let pC be the probability mass function of C. Then the visual entropy
of C is deﬁned as
HV (C) =
∑
x
pC(x) log2
1
pC(x)
− V (C) (5.1)
where V (C) measures the amount of information in C that is redundant to the HVS
- that is the HVS cannot perceive this information.
In Equation 5.1, V (C) is either determined experimentally, or derived from well-
known HVS models [46]. This redundant information is then subtracted from the
standard deﬁnition of entropy to give rise to visual entropy. Therefore visual entropy
can also be written as
HV (C) = H(C)− V (C) (5.2)
In Equation 5.2, H(C) is the standard deﬁnition of entropy.
Notation 1 (Equality of Visual Entropies) HV (C1) = HV (C2) if and only if the
quantities HV (C1) and HV (C2) are equal, and C1 is visually equal to C2. All other
relational operators are deﬁned so that the word equal in the above statement, is
replaced with the respective relational operator.
Since visual entropy only gives a number as to how much information the HVS ab-
sorbs, Notation 1 is required to further establish that two multimedia look the same
1This section focuses on images and videos, however the same principles can be
applied for audio media, as the Human Audio System also ignores details, such as
frequencies outside the human auditory system.
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or look diﬀerent.
It should also be noted that visual entropy is not additive. For example, in
general
HV (C1 ∪ C2) = HV (C1) +HV (C2). (5.3)
In addition,
HV (C1 ∪ C2)  HV (C1) +HV (C2) (5.4)
and
HV (C1 ∪ C2)  HV (C1) +HV (C2). (5.5)
This is due the subjectiveness of V (C) in Equation 22. However Equations 5.6 and
5.7 are true if C1 and C2 are elements from the same image or video.
HV (C1 ∪ C2) ≥ HV (C1) (5.6)
HV (C1 ∪ C2) ≥ HV (C2) (5.7)
For example, if C = C1 ∪C2 ∪ . . ., such that C1 and C2 are frames from the video C,
then adding additional frames from C will only improve the visual quality, but never
degrade the visual quality.
The semantic and feature classes, as described in the above section, are now
formally introduced.
Definition 23 (Semantic Class) Let Ξ be the the semantic class for some multi-
media content C, such that Ξ ⊂ T (C), where T (·) is some transform. The following
relationship is true
HV (Ξ) HV (C) (5.8)
In addition, T−1(Ξ) should provide some semantic information about C.
Definition 24 (Semantic-Feature Representation) (Ξ,Φ) is called the Semantic-
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Feature Representation of C, when Ξ is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 23, and Φ = T (C)\Ξ
is the feature class. The notation is written as C ∼ (Ξ,Φ).
It should be noted that in Deﬁnition 24, (Ξ,Φ) contains the same visual information
as C, which implies HV (Ξ,Φ) = HV (C). Fingerprints were described as subsets of
the feature class in the previous section, however Deﬁnition 25 gives an additional
requirement.
Definition 25 (Fingerprint) A ﬁngerprint Φi ⊆ gi(Φ) obeys the following relation-
ship
∀i HV (Ξ) HV (Ξ,Φi) ≈ HV (C) (5.9)
Deﬁnition 25 requires that the combination of the semantic class along with a ﬁnger-
print is visually similar to the original image or video. Also, in this thesis, gi(·) is the
identity function (i.e. gi(x) = x) for all i.
The Mixed Semantic-Feature Representation is now deﬁned to show how the JSF
paradigm and the watermarking paradigm are related. However, this deﬁnition can
be skipped for the purposes of understanding the JSF paradigm alone.
Definition 26 (Mixed Semantic-Feature Representation) (Ξ,Φ) is called the
Mixed Semantic-Feature Representation of C when Ξ ⊂ T (C, I), where T (·, ·) is a
transform that takes I as side information, and Φ = U(C, J), where U(·, ·) is a
transform that takes J as side information. Ξ obeys the relationship in Deﬁnition 23,
and also provides semantic information about C. In addition |HV (C)−HV (Ξ,Φ)| < 
for small  ≥ 0. The notation is written as C  (Ξ,Φ)
In the Mixed Semantic-Feature Representation, side information is added to deﬁne
both the semantic class as well as the feature class. The transforms applied to obtain
the two classes may also diﬀer. The Semantic-Feature Representation is a speciﬁc
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case of the Mixed Semantic-Feature Representation, when I = J = ∅ contain no
information, and T = U .
Definition 27 (Quasi-JSF Fingerprint) A ﬁngerprint Φi ⊆ gi(Φ,W ) obeys the
following relationship
∀i HV (Ξ) HV (Ξ,Φi) ≈ HV (C) (5.10)
Here gi(·, ·) uses additional information W , independent of C.
Recall that an earlier statement established that the multimedia itself is used as
the fundamental alphabet. This statement is now mathematically elaborated by ﬁrst
noting that the JSF ﬁngerprints can also be described as a binary ﬁngerprint code.
Let the elements in Φ = {φj} be enumerated, i.e. (φ1, φ2, φ3, . . .). Using Deﬁnition
25 with gi as the identity function, every ﬁngerprint Φi can be described as a binary
codeword; if φk ∈ Φi then position k in (φ1, φ2, φ3, . . .) is a 1, otherwise it is a 0. For
example, assume that |Φ| = 4, φ2, φ4 ∈ Φi, and φ1, φ3 /∈ Φi, then the codeword for Φi
is γi = γi1γ
i
2γ
i
3γ
i
4 = 0101.
Definition 28 (JSF Fingerprint Codeword) Let the elements in Φ be enumer-
ated as (φ1, φ2, φ3, . . . , φN). The binary codeword for a ﬁngerprint Φi ⊂ Φ, is γi =
γi1γ
i
2 · · · γiN , where
γij =
 1 if φj ∈ Φi0 if φj /∈ Φi
The concept of collusion-resistance that also overcomes Shortcoming 3 in Section
A of this chapter, is now deﬁned.
Definition 29 (Collusion-Resistant Fingerprint) A set of ﬁngerprints, {Φi}, is
said to be collusion-resistant if it is computationally diﬃcult to create some Φ˜ =
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Z({Φi}), where Z is a collusion attack, and ∀i Φ˜ ∩ Φi = ∅, such that
HV (Ξ, Φ˜) ≈ HV (C)
This last property states that it is computationally cumbersome to create a new
ﬁngerprint that does not contain any of the original ﬁngerprints, and at the same
time has no visual distortion.
A JSF algorithm is optimal if all other algorithms produce fewer (or a equal
number of) ﬁngerprints. To formally deﬁne optimality, the ﬁngerprinting capacity is
introduced.
Definition 30 (Fingerprinting Capacity) The ﬁngerprinting capacity C, of a
media C, is deﬁned to be the maximum number of collusion-resistant ﬁngerprints
{Φi} that can be generated from C, for all semantic-feature representations (Ξ,Φ):
C = max
(Ξ,Φ),Φi⊂Φ
|{Φi}| (5.11)
Definition 31 (Optimal JSF Algorithm) A JSF algorithm is said to be optimal
if and only if the algorithm achieves the ﬁngerprinting capacity.
Note that Deﬁnition 30 provides no tractable method of ﬁnding the ﬁngerprinting
capacity, and determination of this quantity is an open question.
A summary of the JSF design is give below:
(1) Choose a transform T (·)
(2) Separate the multimedia C into its Semantic-Feature Representation, (Ξ,Φ).
(3) Choose a transform gi(·) (possibly the identity function, i.e. gi(x) = x).
(4) Separate gi(Φ) into collusion-resistant ﬁngerprints {Φi}.
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These design steps integrate the multimedia with the ﬁngerprint design, creating a
codebook of collusion-resistant ﬁngerprints ({Φi} in the form given by Deﬁnition 28)
from the source itself, hence the term Joint Source Fingerprinting.
2. Detection of Fingerprints
Some general detection techniques for the JSF paradigm are now presented. The
actual transform and ﬁngerprint selection process will determine the exact, simpliﬁed
detector. Given a possibly corrupted copy of some ﬁngerprinted multimedia (Ξ, Φ˜),
the idea is to detect traces of the original ﬁngerprints {Φi} in Φ˜, and list any possible
suspects. Since the methods described for tracing pirates are traditionally known as
detectors, the tracing algorithm will also be called a detector. This section describes
both hard-decision and soft-decision detectors.
A detector takes a sequence of corrupted ﬁngerprints (φ˜i), and passes each φ˜i
through a function h(·). Recall that in the hard-decision decoder, h(φ˜i) is then
compared to a threshold τ1, and mapped to 1 if h(φ˜i) > τ1, or mapped to 0 if
h(φ˜i) < τ1. After processing all φ˜i in this manner, a word γ˜, consisting of 1’s and
0’s is created. This binary word γ˜ is then compared to all pristine binary codewords
{γi} representing the pristine ﬁngerprints as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 28. The word in
{γi} with the minimum Hamming distance to γ˜ is selected.
In the soft-decision detector, h(φ˜i) is not hard-limited; this means it is not com-
pared to a threshold τ1, and not mapped to 1 or 0. There are two popular soft-decision
decoders: the maximum likelihood detector and maximum a posteriori detector. A
maximum likelihood (ML) detector is given by Equation 5.12.
User i is a suspect = argmax
i
Pr( Φ˜ | Φi ) (5.12)
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Similarly the maximum a posteriori (MAP) detector is given in Equation 5.13.
User i is a suspect = argmax
i
Pr( Φi | Φ˜ ) (5.13)
The hard-decision detector is easier to implement, and also costs less in terms
of computational power and memory. However, the hard-decision detector is usually
suboptimal. The soft-decision detectors are better than the hard-decision detectors
in terms of lower probability of error, if the conditional probabilities are known.
3. Immunity Against Attacks
As mentioned earlier, there are two main types of attacks that colluders can apply:
an estimation attack, and a scrambling attack. In the JSF paradigm, the estimation
attack is not eﬀective if the coalition size is equal to the number of ﬁngerprinted
copies. For example, colluders can combine all their ﬁngerprints to produce (Ξ, Φ˜),
the closest estimate to C ∼ (Ξ,Φ). However, given Φi ⊂ Φ, Φ˜ =
⋃
i Φi is the closest
estimate of C, and hence all the colluders will be detected. On the other hand, removal
of all ﬁngerprints will result in only the semantic class (Ξ, ∅), and this does not have
any commercial value. Recall that in the traditional ﬁngerprinting paradigm, it is
possible to remove all ﬁngerprints, resulting in an original unﬁngerprinted copy. In
the JSF paradigm, this has been shown to result in the semantic class.
The second type of attack is a scrambling attack. Such attacks try to scramble
the ﬁngerprints in such a way that detection of any one colluder is impossible. In the
JSF paradigm, colluders would try to create Φ˜ from their sets of ﬁngerprints {Φi},
such that:
(1) A detector cannot trace the origin of Φ˜;
(2) (Ξ, Φ˜) ≈ (Ξ,Φ).
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According to the JSF paradigm, it is computationally complex to create a Φ˜ such
that HV (Ξ, Φ˜) ≈ HV (C), therefore the scrambling attack is diﬃcult.
In the traditional ﬁngerprinting paradigm, the locations of the ﬁngerprints are
unbeknownst to the attacker, however in the JSF paradigm, this is not the case,
and the colluders can see exactly where the ﬁngerprints are. The diﬃculty is in
manipulating them in such a way as to create new ﬁngerprints that do not exhibit
visual degradation in the resulting media. In addition, attack assumptions, such as
the Marking Assumption, are not necessary. Therefore it should be stressed that
simply comparing the probability of error in the JSF scheme to other schemes is
not enough. Whenever the colluders manage to successfully scramble the ﬁngerprint,
visual distortion should be present, and hence a missed detection is more acceptable.
C. Insights and Implications
This section consists of two major parts. The ﬁrst subsection will compare the JSF
paradigm to other similar ﬁelds of research. The second subsection will propose
possible implementation strategies using the JSF, hence showing its potential.
1. Joint Source Fingerprinting in Relation to Other Fields of Research
This section examines how the JSF paradigm is related to similar research ﬁelds. The
two similar research ﬁelds are multimedia data compression, and digital watermark-
ing.
a. Joint Source Fingerprinting in Relation to Digital Watermarking
In most digital watermarking schemes, the watermark or ﬁngerprint is embedded in
the transform domain in the mid to high frequency components, where the watermark
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is not visible [16].
Suppose T (·) is a frequency transform (such as DCT or DWT), and let Ξ be the
lowpass-ﬁltered T (C). Then Φ = T (C)\Ξ represents the mid to high frequency com-
ponents of C. Now Φi = gi(Φ,Wi) = Φ⊕Wi, where Wi is the watermark/ﬁngerprint
created from a collusion-resistant codebook, and it is added (denoted as ⊕) to the
mid to high frequency components.
From this analysis, digital watermarking is a speciﬁc example of the Quasi-JSF
paradigm. Digital watermarking assumes the semantic class to be a low frequency
representation of C. In the JSF paradigm, this need not be the case. In fact, a high
frequency representation of C gives enough semantic information, as the outline of
objects gives enough visual information as to what an object may be [47]. Therefore
the JSF paradigm is more general than the traditional ﬁngerprinting paradigm.
b. Joint Source Fingerprinting in Relation to Data Compression for Multimedia
The JSF paradigm makes use of visual entropies as does data compression for multi-
media. In multimedia data compression, the goal is also to segregate the multimedia
C, into two classes (Ξ′,Φ′). Here HV (C) ≈ HV (Ξ′), and Φ′ contains the visually
redundant information V (C), as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 22. Hence Φ′ can be discarded,
resulting in Ξ′, a compressed version of C. A good multimedia data compression
scheme tries to segregate C into (Ξ′,Φ′) in such a way that Φ′ is as large as possible,
and Ξ′ is as small as possible, while still maintaining HV (C) ≈ HV (Ξ′). In the JSF
paradigm, the segregation (Ξ,Φ) is performed in such a way so that Ξ gives enough
semantic information, but has no commercial value because it is a visually degraded
version of C. This leaves Φ with redundant information as well as visually important
information that when added to Ξ, produces a closer approximation to C. The rela-
tionship between JSF and multimedia data compression is given by Equations 5.14
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and 5.15.
HV (Ξ) < HV (Ξ
′) ≈ HV (C) (5.14)
HV (Φ
′) < HV (Φ) (5.15)
One might envision that (Ξ,Φ) can be arrived at by taking (Ξ′,Φ′), and donating
elements of Ξ′ to Φ′, thereby increasing visual information in Φ′ (the result is Φ), and
reducing visual information in Ξ′ (the result is Ξ).
2. Examples of Techniques Using the JSF Paradigm
This section presents some practical as well as abstract examples of ﬁngerprinting
techniques and attacks under the JSF paradigm.
a. Multiple Compression Units
In this scheme, suppose there are N diﬀerent non-ideal (i.e. there are always some
visual redundancies left over after compression) multimedia compression algorithms.
The multimedia C is processed by each of the N compression algorithms, resulting
in N diﬀerent outputs {Ci}Ni=1. This technique actually conforms to part of the JSF
paradigm. Since the compression algorithms are not ideal, (i.e. there are always
some redundancies leftover), each of the {Ci}Ni=1 will be slightly diﬀerent. Since
{Ci}Ni=1 are all visually identical to C, they share the same semantic class Ξ . The
ﬁngerprints are then deﬁned as Φi = T (C) \ Ξ. Note however, that the ﬁngerprints
may not be collusion-resistant, and the presence or absence of the collusion-resistant
property depends on the compression algorithms used. Figure 14 depicts the multiple
compressor method.
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Fig. 14. Fingerprinted Media from Multiple Compression Units
b. Ideal Compression Attack
Suppose that there exists an ideal compression algorithm ι(·), that removes all visual
redundancies, i.e. H(ι(C)) = HV (ι(C)).
2 In this case ι((Ξ,Φi)) = ι((Ξ,Φj)) for
all i, j. Any detection scheme would fail, since any ﬁngerprinted media (Ξ,Φi), can
result in ι((Ξ,Φ)). Fortunately ideal compression of multimedia does not exist, since
V (C) is experimentally determined, hence absolute removal of visual redundancy in
any media is impossible. Any non-ideal compression algorithm used on (Ξ,Φi) would
result in a diﬀerent output for diﬀerent i, since some visual redundancies are not
removed.
2When the visual entropy is equal to the standard entropy, V (C) = 0, implying
there are no visual redundancies.
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c. Frame-based JSF for Video
Perhaps the simplest and most elegant example of using the JSF paradigm is the
frame-based method for video.
First, suppose C is a video with a very high frame rate (i.e. many frames
per second). Let the transform T (·) separate the video C into frames, T (C) =
{c1, c2, . . . cN}. Now let Ξ be a decimated version of {c1, c2, . . . cN}.3 The remaining
frames that were decimated now constitute Φ = T (C) \ Ξ. Φ can now be separated
into M partitions {Φi} (i.e. Φ =
⋃M
i=1 Φi), such that ∀i = j Φi ∩ Φj = ∅, and
∀i = 1, 2, . . .M HV (Ξ,Φi) ≈ HV (C).
Suppose the colluders try to remove the ﬁngerprints. With each frame that
they discard, the video becomes increasingly distorted. When all the ﬁngerprints are
removed, the colluders are left with a motion-choppy video, which has no commercial
value. Now suppose the colluders combine their ﬁngerprints by including all frames
from their copies. This would negligibly enhance the video quality, however all the
colluders’ ﬁngerprints are present in this video.
Finally, suppose the colluders average corresponding frames from their copies.
Since each frame diﬀers a little, objects in each frame are shifted a little, therefore
averaging of corresponding frames will result in blurry frames [45]. The colluders may
try to accurately register each frame (that is align the objects in each corresponding
frame), and then average the corresponding frames. This is a computationally com-
plex process, as there is a need to ﬁrst search for diﬀering objects, and then spatially
synchronize them [48]. It is this lack of spatial synchronization that makes attacks
more diﬃcult. Figure 15 depicts the lack of spatial synchronization between frames.
3Ξ is similar to a video from the Charlie Chaplin era - although crude, the seman-
tics of the ﬁlm is still understood by the audience.
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The circle in the frame on the right is in its original position. The solid circle in the
frame on the left is in its new position (original position is faded and dotted in the left
frame), and therefore is not synchronized with the circle in its original position. In
Fig. 15. Spatial Desynchronization of Objects Between Frames
the traditional ﬁngerprinting paradigm using watermarking, all ﬁngerprinted copies
are synchronized, therefore collusion attacks such as averaging do not produce visual
distortion. The frame-based method introduced in this section eliminates synchro-
nization, thereby punishing colluders with visual distortion when collusion attacks
are applied.
The next section develops the frame-based JSF algorithm for video, and subse-
quent sections provide simulation results.
D. A Suboptimal JSF Algorithm for Video
In this section, a practical suboptimal JSF algorithm is presented for video sequences.
The presentation of this algorithm is divided into the three parts. The ﬁrst part shows
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how to derive the semantic class, while the second part shows how the ﬁngerprints
are selected. Finally the last part will derive the detector, or tracing algorithm.
The transform T (·) used for video input will consist of breaking the video into
frames, which is the frame-based method discussed in Section c of this chapter. To re-
capitulate, the frame-based method decimates (also known as downsampling) frames
from a video sequence, resulting in the semantic class. The speciﬁc downsampling
rate will be derived in the next section. Frames that are not part of the semantic
class, i.e. the feature class, are then partitioned so that each partition along with the
semantic class will result in a video that is visually similar to the original video.
1. Deriving the Semantic Class
The semantic class should bare some resemblance to the original video sequence, but
it should be visually degraded to the point that it has no commercial value. In the
frame-based method, the semantic class can be derived by decimating or downsam-
pling frames from the original video sequence. The question is what rate should the
downsampler be in order for the downsampled video to have no commercial value?
The answer lies in the downsampling theory from digital signal processing theory.
If a discrete-time signal x(n) is downsampled by a factor of D (i.e. the resulting
dowsampled signal xd(n) can be written in terms of the original signal x(n) as xd(n) =
x(Dn)), then frequency aliasing will occur if the discrete-time Fourier transform of
x(n), denoted as X(ω), has frequency components in −π ≤ ω < − π
D
or π
D
< ω ≤ π.
When frequency aliasing occurs, there is no way to recover the original signal x(n)
from its downsampled version. This is an attractive feature that can be used in
creating the semantic class, because an attacker cannot recover the original video
from a frequency aliased version of the original video.
The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd the frequency spectrum of the original video, so that
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the factor D required for frequency aliasing can be determined. However, a video
sequence is represented by a 3-dimensional data structure (space and time), while the
downsampling theory is for 1-dimensional signals. The dimension of interest, is the
temporal axis, since downsampling is with respect to frames, which encode time, so
a video sequence can be transformed into a 1-dimensional signal. First, each frame is
partitioned into non-overlapping 8 × 8 or 16 × 16 macro-blocks, which is customary
in the ﬁeld of image and video compression research [46]. Let Bni (x, y) be a b × b
macro-block where n is the frame number, (x, y) is the pixel coordinate relative to
a corner of the macro-block, and i indexes the macro-block within one frame. Each
macro block is then averaged, 1
b×b
∑b
x=1
∑b
y=1 B
n
i (x, y), and the averaged results for
macro-blocks aligned temporarily will constitute the 1-dimensional signal xi(n). The
cuttoﬀ frequency ωc(i) is determined from Xi(ω), the Fourier transform of xi(n). This
value is deﬁned by Deﬁnition 32.
Definition 32 ωc > 0 is the -cutoﬀ frequency of X(ω) when ωc is the largest value
such that |X(ω)| <  when ωc < ω < 2π − ωc.
Now the downsampling factor Di for the set of averaged ith macro-blocks given
by Equation 5.16 will guarantee frequency aliasing for that set of aligned macro-blocks
alone.
Di =
⌈
π
ωc(i)
⌉
+ 1 (5.16)
Here n is the ceiling function that returns the ﬁrst integer greater than or equal to
n. The reason why 5.16 is the downsampling factor for a set of aligned macro-blocks
is because as mentioned earlier, if there are frequency components in π
D
< ω ≤ π,
then aliasing occurs. By Deﬁnition 32, there are frequency components when ω < ωc,
therefore if π
D
< ωc (i.e. D >
π
ωc
), then there will be frequency components in
π
D
< ω ≤ π, hence aliasing occurs.
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A set of downsampling factors {Di} for each macro-block is now available. The
single downsampling factor that will ensure aliasing of all sets of macro-blocks is the
maximum downsampling factor as given by Equation 5.17.
D = maxi{Di} (5.17)
The semantic class is formed by frame-wise downsampling of the original video by a
factor D, given by Equation 5.17, which results in an aliased video.
2. Obtaining the Fingerprints
Once the semantic class is created via downsampling with the downsampling factor
found in the previous section, the feature class is automatically those frames that are
not included in the semantic class. Now the task is to assign frames from the feature
class to diﬀerent users, so that any user who has frames from the semantic class as
well as frames from the feature class, can construct a video that looks visually similar
to the original video. The question is how to partition the feature class to achieve
this goal? The answer lies in the use of motion vectors found in the ﬁeld of video
compression research.
In video compression, motion is encoded using what are known as motion vectors.
The MPEG 1/2 standard uses the translation model for encoding motion [46]. A video
is sequence of frames, such that consecutive frames usually give rise to moving objects,
which can be modeled as translation motion.4 The motion vector gives the magnitude
and direction of the translation motion of a macro-block between two frames. Figure
16 illustrates the concept of a motion vector. In Figure 16, the blue macro-block
experiences a translation motion between the two consecutive frames. In Frame i+1,
4This is a good approximation to motion, although other models that incorporate
zooming motion, rotational motion, etc. do exist.
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Frame i Frame i+1
Fig. 16. Illustration of a Motion Vector Between Two Consecutive Frames
the original position of the macro-block is faded and dotted, while the new position
of the macro-block is blue. The red motion vector describes this translation motion.
Techniques for ﬁnding motion vectors are found in the video compression literature,
such as [46]. In this work, the 2-D logarithmic search is implemented.
The average motion between two frames gives a good indication of whether the
two frames are redundant (that is, there is not much motion occurring between the
two frames), too far apart (that is, there is too much translation motion between the
two frames, so playing the two frames consecutively will result in choppy motion), or
just enough motion (that is, there is little redundancy, and it is visually acceptable
to the human eye). The average motion vector between two frames is now derived.
Suppose that with each macro-block Bi in the ﬁrst frame, there is a motion
vector mi that describes the translation motion of Bi from the ﬁrst frame to the
second frame. The average motion, AM between two frames is then the average
magnitude of all motion vectors, given in Equation 5.18.
AM =
∑
i
‖mi‖ (5.18)
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Whether two frames are redundant, too far apart, or just enough, can be deter-
mined by comparing the average motion of the two frames to some threshold. For
example, given two frames, if their AM > τam, then the two frames are too far apart,
while AM <  means the two frames are redundant. Using this idea, the frames from
the feature set can be chosen so that AM between consecutive frames is maintained
around some constant. The ﬁngerprinting algorithm is now described formally.
Let Ξ be the semantic class, or set of frames derived as in the previous section.
Then Φ is the feature class consisting of frames not in Ξ. From Φ, frames are chosen
to maximize the AM between consecutive frames with the constraint that each AM
is smaller than τam. This subset of frames will ensure that there are no redundancies,
and at the same time the motion is smooth. In creating diﬀerent ﬁngerprinted videos,
frames from the feature class that have been used are not reused again, therefore the
ﬁngerprints are a partition of the feature class. This is now expressed mathematically.
To create ﬁngerprint Φi, which is a sequence of frames (φk), choose the sequence (φk)
such that
∀φk ∈ Φi ⊆ Φ(i)  Φ \
(⋃
j<i
Φj
)
AM(φk, φk+1) = max
φm∈Φ(i)
AM(φm, φm+1)
with constraint AM(φk, φk+1) ≤ τam (5.19)
The ﬁrst line in Equation 5.19 ensures that the frames in Φi have not been used by
previous ﬁngerprints; in addition, Φ(i) deﬁnes the part of the feature class that has
not been used by other ﬁngerprints. The second and third lines in Equation 5.19
ensure that the average motion between frames is as far apart as possible without
being too far apart, dictated by the threshold constraint.
All ﬁngerprinted videos should have the same number of frames as the original
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video, to ensure that audio accompanying the video sequence is synchronized with the
the video. This is achieved by simply repeating frames whenever there are missing
frames. Mathematically, recall that each ﬁngerprint has an associated binary code-
word. A 0 in the codeword means the frame in that position is not included in the
ﬁngerprint Φi. This frame position should be ﬁlled in by the frame associated with
the ﬁrst 1 to the left of any 0. For example, let (φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4) be a sequence of frames,
and suppose that the binary codeword γi associated ﬁngerprint Φi is γ
i = 1010. Then
the following frames are played in order: Φi = (φ1, φ1, φ3, φ3). If there is no 1 to the
left of a 0, the closest frame from the semantic class is used. For example, if γi = 0101,
then suppose ξ ∈ Ξ is the closest frame to φ1. Then the following frames are played
in order: Φi = (ξ, φ2, φ2, φ4).
3. Detection of Fingerprints
The proposed ﬁngerprint detection scheme will only return one culprit from the coali-
tion. An attacked video sequence is compared with all pristine ﬁngerprinted copies,
and the pristine ﬁngerprinted copy "closest" to the attacked video is selected as being
part of the coalition. To reduce the computational load, only the ﬁngerprints Φi are
compared, while the semantic class is not compared, since the semantic class is the
same in all copies. The semantic class can however be used to estimate the attack
noise, since all individuals have a copy of the semantic class, and every frame should
be attacked the same way in order not to introduce visual distortion. This is similar
to using a reference watermark to estimate noise parameters in [25]. Attack noise
estimation using the semantic class is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The detector will be a "minimum distance detector", such that the pristine
ﬁngerprint Φi is chosen whenever it has the "minimum distance" with the attacked
ﬁngerprint Φ˜. Here, distance is not measured via the Euclidean distance, but rather
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the average motion AM distance. For example, if a Euclidean-type distance is used
as the minimum distance receiver, then the decision would be made according to
Equation 5.20.
user i is a suspect = argmin
i
∑
f∈Φi,g∈Φ˜
‖f − g‖2 (5.20)
Empirical evidence shows that using the Euclidean distance for the proposed algo-
rithm will not suﬃce, because all the frames are highly correlated. For example, the
correlation coeﬃcient between frame 1 and frames 1 to 35 for the test video used in the
next section is provided in Figure 17. It can be seen that frame 1 is highly correlated
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Fig. 17. Correlation Between Frame 1 and Frames Nearby
with its neighbours. The minimum distance detector using the Euclidean distance is
actually the same as a maximum correlation receiver when the noise added to a signal
is 0-mean, white, and Gaussian. Therefore since all frames are highly correlated, a
78
correlator cannot adequately distinguish one ﬁngerprinted video from another.
The key to ﬁnding the right distance metric is in recalling that each ﬁngerprinted
video diﬀers from the others in that there is some small motion imperceptible to the
human eye. However, detection of this motion is possible using the average motion as
a metric for distance. Therefore the detector should be given according to Equation
5.21.
user i is a suspect = argmin
i
∑
f∈Φi,g∈Φ˜
AM(f, g) (5.21)
Further justiﬁcation of 5.21 can be found in Appendix D.
Section E will show that this means of detection is viable against selected single-
user attacks and selected collusion attacks. In the next section, a method for sup-
porting a larger set of users is presented, because the ﬁngerprinting capacity of the
proposed algorithm is not large.
4. Supporting a Larger Set of Users
The reader will note that the number of users that can be supported by the proposed
algorithm is not large. One alternative method to increasing the number of unique
copies is to combine other ﬁngerprinting schemes with the proposed algorithm. For
example, future work might focus on the integration of the JSF scheme with the
watermarking scheme, such that watermarks are embedded in the semantic class, or
other locations of a JSF ﬁngerprinted video. This section will propose a method that
does not incorporate other ﬁngerprinting schemes.
The following algorithm is inspired by the outer code used in [3]. The idea is
that given only n ﬁngerprinted copies, N  n copies can be created by partitioning
each copy into L disjoint sets of frames; these frames can be adjacent frames or non-
contiguous frames. A new ﬁngerprinted video is then created for each of the N users
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by assembling L partitions, where each partition is randomly chosen from one of the
original 1 to n ﬁngerprinted videos corresponding to that partition. This can be
thought of as using the original n ﬁngerprinted copies as the alphabet in creating a
new n-ary codebook W , whose codewords wi ∈W are of length L, and represent the
ﬁngerprint for User i. Although it is possible to create nL new ﬁngerprinted copies
from the original n copies, only a smaller subset, namely N , of these copies is used,
because distributing all nL copies will result in no collusion-resistant properties.
Detection will involve detecting the n original ﬁngerprints (using the original
detector) in each of the L partitions, and from this, forming a n-ary word of length
L, denoted w˜. The codeword wi ∈ W that is closest to w˜ in terms of the maximum
number of positions that match, is selected as a suspect. Assuming that the original
n ﬁngerprinted copies have negligible probability of error when collusion attacks are
applied, the new probability of error is bounded by Equation 5.22, where c is the
maximum coalition size, and is chosen such that c < n
2
.
 ≤ N ·Q
(√
L
n− 1
(n
c
− 1
))
(5.22)
Here Q(·) is the tail probability of a standard Normal distribution (zero-mean, unit-
variance Gaussian) as given by Equation 5.23.
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2π
exp
(
−x
2
2
)
dx (5.23)
The proof for the bound in Equation 5.22 can be found in Appendix D.
5. Eﬃcient Broadcasting
It may seem that a naive many-to-many broadcasting scheme is the only possible
solution, given all ﬁngerprinted copies are diﬀerent; that is, a unique ﬁngerprinted
80
video is sent to every subscribed user. However, inherent in the JSF paradigm,
is the partitioning of the source data into a public class of data (semantic class),
which all users receive, and a private class of data (feature class), which constitutes
the unique ﬁngerprints. Therefore the semantic class only needs to be broadcast
once to all subscribed users. All the ﬁngerprints can be broadcast to all users, with
each ﬁngerprint encrypted so that only the destined user can decrypt her ﬁngerprint
using her corresponding private key. This method of broadcasting the ﬁngerprints
is bandwidth ineﬃcient, since all users receive all ﬁngerprint frames, but can only
decrypt a subset of these frames, hence the rest of the frames are wasting bandwidth.
The solution is to use motion vectors again.
In video compression, one of the principle agents responsible for high compression
rates is the encoding of frames using motion vectors [46]. This technique, referred to
as motion-compensated predictive coding, is described in detail in [46], but will be
succinctly summarized here. As mentioned earlier, the motion of a block Bi between
two frames, can be described using motion vectors mi. In addition, an error matrix
i is a matrix with the same dimensions as the block Bi, containing the diﬀerence
between the two blocks associated by a motion vector. Hence for each block in the ﬁrst
frame, the corresponding translated block in the second frame can be reconstructed
using the motion vector and error matrix. Since the values in the error vectors are
typically much smaller than the values in the original block, compression is achieved.
Therefore when frames from the feature class are broadcast to users, only encrypted
pairs of motion vectors and error matrices are sent, thus reducing bandwidth. The
broadcasting scheme is summarized by the equations below.
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Compression : Compress(Φi) (5.24)
= Compress(φi,1, φi,2, . . . , φi,n) (5.25)
= ({(mj , j)}(i,1), {(mj , j)}(i,2), . . . , {(mj, j)}(i,n))(5.26)
Broadcast : EKeveryone(Ξ) (5.27)
{EKi(Compress(Φi))} (5.28)
Keys for User i : Keveryone − all other users have this key (5.29)
Ki − only User i has this key (5.30)
Decoding for User i : Ξ = DKeveryone(EKeveryone(Ξ)) (5.31)
Φi = Uncompress(DKi(EKi(Compress(Φi)))) (5.32)
Symmetric-key cryptography is assumed above, that is the encryption key is the same
as the decryption key, although the scheme can easily be extended to an asymmetric-
key algorithm, in which the encryption key and decryption key are diﬀerent. Keveryone
is a key used to decrypt the semantic class, and it is available to all subscribed users.
Ki is a key available only to User i, and is used to decrypt ﬁngerprint i.
a. Comparison of Proposed Broadcasting Scheme to Other Broadcasting Schemes
In evaluating the performance of the proposed broadcasting scheme, the performance
metric used is the ratio of how much data is sent using an eﬃcient broadcasting
scheme, to how much data is sent using a many-to-many approach. For example, one
possible many-to-many approach is to send N uniquely encrypted ﬁngerprinted copies
to all N users, so that each user will decode her own copy, while the other N − 1
encrypted copies are essentially "wasted". In the proposed broadcasting scheme, the
only "wasted" data are the ﬁngerprint frames Φi, which are only useful for User i,
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and not any User j = i. The performance ratio can be deﬁned as follows. Let S be
the size in bytes of one ﬁngerprinted copy, and assume that all ﬁngerprinted copies
are of the same size. Therefore, given N users, the many-to-many approach would
result in sending N × S bytes. For the proposed broadcasting scheme, assume that
for each ﬁngerprinted copy, there are F unique ﬁngerprint frames in a total of T
frames for the entire video. Again, it is assumed that all users have F unique frames,
and a total of T frames. Then the semantic class would be S − F
T
× S bytes long,
which is sent to all users. Let the the ﬁngerprinted copies be c-collusion-resistant,
and extended to N users via the technique in the previous section. Therefore only
c× F
T
bytes of unique ﬁngerprint frames are sent to all users. The performance ratio
for the proposed broadcasting scheme is therefore given by Equation 5.33.
Performance Ratio for Proposed Broadcasting =
(
S − F
T
S
)
+ c× F
T
S
N × S
=
1 + (c− 1)F
T
N
(5.33)
The proposed broadcasting scheme is compared to the broadcasting scheme in [3]
(reviewed in Chapter III). For the broadcasting scheme in [3], the performance ratio
is 2×S
N×S =
2
N
. The smaller the ratio, the more eﬃcient the broadcasting scheme,
therefore the proposed broadcasting scheme is more eﬃcient than that in [3] when
Equation 5.34 is satisﬁed.
1 + (c− 1)F
T
< 2 (5.34)
Figure 18 shows the region for which the proposed broadcasting scheme is more
eﬃcient than the scheme in [3]. A coalition size of 20 only allows 13 unique frames
out of 260 frames in order to satisfy Equation 5.34. It turns out that this is suﬃcient,
as will be shown in Section E. In fact, the simulation results yield c = 5, F = 13,
and so these quantities are well within the region in Figure 18.
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Fig. 18. Region Such That the Proposed Broadcasting Scheme Is More Eﬃcient Than
the Broadcasting Scheme in [3]
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The proposed broadcasting scheme is also compared to the ﬁngerprinting multi-
cast scheme in [11]. However, the performance ratio in [11] is not the same as that
used in this thesis, because multicast metrics are used. In [11], the performance ratio
is given in Equation 5.35.
γfm =
Cunitmulti × Lenfmmulti +N × Cunituni × Lenfmuni
N × Cunituni × Lenpu
(5.35)
The Cunitmulti and C
unit
uni are costs associated with using the multicast and unicast chan-
nels. The ratio
Cunitmulti
Cunituni
 NEoS with EoS = 0.7 is used in [11]. Lenfmmulti is associated
with the size of the data that is the same for all users (i.e. the semantic class in the
proposed scheme), and Lenfmuni is associated with the size of the data that is diﬀerent
for all users (i.e. the unique ﬁngerprints in the proposed scheme). Finally Lenpu is
associated with the size of one ﬁngerprint copy if no clever broadcast scheme is used.
Therefore, if the cost metrics Cunitmulti and C
unit
uni are are set to 1, then the performance
ratio in Equation 5.35 would be the same as that used in this thesis. Unfortunately
the results in [11] are obtained empirically through simulation, so a closed-form ex-
pression is not available. However, some bounds can be established such that the
results in [11] can be compared with the performance of the proposed scheme in this
thesis. The right-hand side in Equation 5.36 is the performance ratio used in this
thesis. It can be shown that multiplying the ratio in Equation 5.35 by N−0.7 will
result in a performance ratio less than that used in this thesis. Recall that a smaller
ratio means better eﬃciency, therefore if the proposed scheme has a smaller ratio
than those in [11] multiplied by the factor N−0.7, then the proposed scheme is more
eﬃcient.
N−0.7γfm <
Lenfmmulti
N × Lenpu +
Lenfmuni
Lenpu
(5.36)
Figure 19 compares the eﬃciency of the proposed broadcasting scheme to that in
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[11]. The most eﬃcient curve from [11] (Miss America video) is used. Recall that this
curve is the left-hand side of Equation 5.36, which means the true data is less eﬃcient
than depicted in Figure 19. For (c, F ) = (20, 13) , the proposed scheme might be less
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Fig. 19. Comparison of Broadcast Eﬃciency Between Proposed Scheme and Scheme
Found in [11]
eﬃcient than that in [11]. However for (c, F ) = (5, 13), the proposed scheme is more
eﬃcient than that in [11]. It should be noted however, that the proposed scheme
is c-collusion-resistant for small c, while the scheme in [11] is c-collusion-resistant
for larger c, but [11] lacks JSF properties, such as punishing colluders with visual
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degradation.
E. Simulation Results
In testing the ﬁngerprinting algorithm and detection algorithm from Section D, 12 out
of 20 videos from the Video Quality Experts Group (VQEG) were selected. These 12
videos capture motion ranging from translation, zooming in and out, to little motion,
slow motion and fast motion.5 In this section, the test video used is that of a woman
talking on the phone. The reason why this video is used is because there is very little
motion, so it is actually easier to attack; this makes the results from this input video,
somewhat of a lower bound on performance. Recall that the detector utilizes average
motion, so a video with little motion will result in very small average motions, which
is a poor condition for the detector. The results will show that even though this
input is the weakest of the 12 videos, correct identiﬁcation of one pirate, as well as
punishment via visual degradation is achieved. Additional simulation results can be
found in Appendix E.
The tests performed are categorized into single-user attacks, and collusion at-
tacks. The single-user attacks include JPEG compression, AWGN, translation of
random macro-blocks, and a rotation attack. The collusion attacks consist of aver-
aging, random scrambling, and the order statistics attacks given by Equations 2.11
to 2.16. Comparison of results with other algorithms is limited to showing how the
JSF algorithm punishes colluders with visual degradation, while the traditional wa-
termarking algorithms do not, since this is one of the main contributions of the JSF
paradigm.
5The other 8 videos were not ﬁt for testing because they were animations, or
computer rendered graphics.
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1. Robustness to Single-User Attacks
In the single user attack, the goal of the attacker is to perturb a frame, so the
perturbed frame is far apart from the original frame in terms of average motion. The
results show that the speciﬁed attacks cannot feign motion.
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Fig. 20. Average Motion Between Consecutive Frames and False Average Motion From
Single-User Attacks
In Figure 20, the top-most curve (red) depicts the average motion between con-
secutive frames in the test video. The curves below show the average motion between
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the original frame, and the attacked frame. It can be seen that these attacks do not
simulate motion, as their average motions are very small, and usually less than 1.
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Fig. 21. (a) AWGN Attack with Variance 0.005 on Each RGB Colour Plane; (b) Ran-
dom Block Translation Without Restrictions; (c) Random Block Translation
Restricted to Background
The speciﬁcs of the attacks are now described. In the JPEG attack, each frame is
compressed using the JPEG write option from MATLAB. The quality is set at 40%,
which will give a little visual distortion. Settings of lower quality, such as a value of
30% result in a lot of visible blockiness. From Figure 20, the JPEG compression attack
is the most eﬀective out of the other attacks tested, since its average motion curve
is higher than the other curves. To mitigate this attack, frames can be compressed
at a visually acceptable level prior to ﬁngerprinting, therefore the attacker cannot
compress the frames more without introducing visual distortion.
The additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) attack was described in Chapter
II. The variance used in the simulation is 0.001 applied on each of the RGB colour
planes. Any other variance used, produces visible distortions. For example, Figure
21(a) shows the ﬁrst frame being attacked with a variance of 0.005. Even the tested
variance of 0.001, produces visible distortion when the frames are played consecutively.
Again, the AWGN attack does not mimic motion, and the attacked frames are close
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to the original frames in the average motion sense.
The random block translation attack is geared especially at crippling the mini-
mum average motion distance detector. It is hoped that by translating random blocks,
the resulting frame will be far away from the original frame in terms of average motion,
since the translation model is the underlying assumption in computing the average
motion. However, the problem with this attack is that most of the time moving a
macro-block will easily aﬀect the visual quality of the frame. Therefore the attacker
must spend more computational energy in ﬁnding parts of the frame that are immune
to visual degradation when blocks are moved, such as any uniform background. Even
when such uniform backgrounds are identiﬁed, which in the ﬁrst place may not ex-
ist, the number of blocks that can be translated without visual degradation is low.
Figure 21(b) shows a random block translation without restrictions, hence visually
degrading the face, while 21(c) shows the background becoming visually noisy when
100 blocks are translated. This means only a few blocks can be translated without
visual distortion. In simulating such an attack without visual distortion, 10 blocks
were randomly translated. The results in Figure 20 show that this does not mimic
true motion, since the average motion is close to 0.
The ﬁnal single-user attack tested is the rotation attack. There are again re-
strictions which the attacker must abide to, or the consequence is a visually distorted
video. For example, all frames must be rotated the same way, or very close, otherwise
when played, the video will appear choppy. In addition, the rotation cannot be too
large, thus the attacker will make a rotation of no more than 1 degree. The ﬁrst
restriction that all frames have to be rotated the same way, allows the receiver to
estimate the rotation incurred. For example, all ﬁngerprinted copies share the same
semantic class frames, so these frames can be used to estimate the rotation of all
frames. Once this estimate is available, the receiver can undo the rotation, by ap-
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plying a reverse rotation. The test performs rotation estimation and reverse rotation
before the decision is made. Figure 20 shows that the small errors incurred in re-
versing the rotation are not enough to mimic true motion, and hence these attacked
frames are close to the original frames in the average motion sense.
2. Robustness to Collusion
Continuing with the video used in the previous section, 5 ﬁngerprinted videos are
generated using the proposed algorithm. All 5 ﬁngerprinted videos appear visually
identical when played, and each copy has 13 unique frames, which when removed,
results in a video with visual degradation - i.e. the motion is choppy and not smooth.
All 25 − (5
0
) − (5
1
)
= 26 coalitions of two or more ﬁngerprinted videos are tested
against collusion attacks. The proposed minimum distance detector is then used to
determine one of the suspects.
The results for all 26 average attacks are presented in Figure 22. For example, in
the top left corner, the graph shows 5 bars. Two bars, 4 and 5, are red, meaning ﬁn-
gerprinted copies 4 and 5 were averaged, resulting in the collusion attacked video; the
blue bars correspond to innocent users who do not participate in the average attack.
The bars themselves show the AM distance between the attacked video and the pris-
tine copy. For example, bar 1 in the same top left corner graph is approximately 20 -
this means the AM distance between copy 1 and the attacked video is approximately
20. Recall that the minimum distance receiver will choose the bar with the lowest
value. In the top left corner graph, the lowest value is bar 4. This also happens to be
one of the colluders, since its bar is red, therefore the receiver successfully identiﬁes
one suspect. Looking at all the other graphs, the minimum distance receiver always
successfully identiﬁes one culprit, as the bar with the smallest value is always red. In
addition, the red bars are always smaller than the blue bars.
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Fig. 22. Y-axis on Each Graph Is the Average Motion Distance Between the Average
Attacked Video (Averaging of Fingerprinted Videos Whose Bars Are Red)
and the Fingerprinted Video (Whose Number Is on the X-axis)
92
In addition to studying the ability of the detector to correctly identify one pi-
rate, these simulation results also show how the proposed algorithm causes visual
degradation as punishment for collusion. In Figure 23, a frame appears blurry after
an average attack, hence reducing its commercial value. In the traditional paradigm,
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Fig. 23. (a) Original Frame; (b) Blurry Frame After Average Attack; (c) Average
Attack on 60 Watermarked Frames
where a ﬁngerprint codeword is embedded into the frame using a DCT-based water-
marking technique [1], the average attacked frame appears identical to the original
frame.
All 26 coalitions of two or more ﬁngerprinted videos are tested against the ran-
dom scrambling attack given by Equation 2.9. Recall that in this attack, a pixel is
randomly chosen from the coalition’s collection of pixels corresponding to the same
coordinates. The results for all 26 attacks are presented in Figure 24. Again, all
suspects are identiﬁed correctly, since all the red bars have minimum average motion
distance. In addition, the red bars are always smaller than the blue bars.
The proposed algorithm also causes visual degradation as punishment for collu-
sion. In Figure 25, the eyes become distorted after the random scrambling attack. In
the traditional paradigm, where a ﬁngerprint codeword is embedded into the frame
using a wavelet-based watermarking technique [22], the random scrambling attacked
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Fig. 25. (a) Original Frame; (b) Distortion Over Eyes After a Random Scrambling
Attack; (c) Random Scrambling on 60 Watermarked Frames
frame appears identical to the original frame. This is because all frames are per-
fectly synchronized in the sense that any salient features, such as the eyes, are at the
same position across all ﬁngerprinted copies. In the proposed algorithm, the lack of
synchronization brings about the property of visual degradation as punishment for
collusion.
All the nonlinear attacks described by Equations 2.11 to 2.16 are also imple-
mented. The results are all the same in that one suspect is always identiﬁed correctly,
and the culprits always have the smallest average motion distance. In particular, for
comparison purposes, the results for the randomized negative attack is presented in
Figure 26. Recall that this attack randomly chooses either the maximum pixel value
or minimum pixel value. In [21], it is shown that this attack is eﬀective at destroying
the Gaussian i.i.d. ﬁngerprints. However, here the attack has no eﬀect, and a sus-
pect is always correctly identiﬁed. The other nonlinear attacks are also ineﬀective at
destroying the ﬁngerprints created by the proposed algorithm.
Finally, further evidence in Figure 27 shows that visual degradation increases
as more copies are used in the collusion attacks for the proposed algorithm. The 60
ﬁngerprinted frames are generated by interpolating between two frames, using upsam-
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pling and ﬁltering, a well-known method in signal processing. Although generation
of ﬁngerprint frames via interpolation is not used in the proposed algorithm, because
the resulting frames are "too close" to one another, hence leading to higher error rate,
the fact that the PSNR decreases for "close frames" will imply that the PSNR will
decrease even more for frames further apart. On the other hand, using watermarking
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Fig. 27. PSNR vs. Number of Colluders for the JSF Video Algorithm and Watermark-
ing Algorithms from [1] (DCT) and [22] (Wavelet).
techniques [1, 22], the attacked frame either becomes more similar to the original
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non-ﬁngerprinted frames, or does not degrade in visual quality. The curves for the
watermarked methods in Figure 27 are generated by running 500 random experiments
for each set of colluders (2 to 60 colluders on the x-axis), and then averaging out the
500 PSNRs for each set of colluders. In the average attack, the PSNR is expected to
increase, since the watermarks have zero mean, and hence averaging zero-mean i.i.d.
random variables tend to zero as the number of random variables increases according
to Kolmogorov’s Second Strong Law of Large Numbers. For the random attack, the
PSNR of the attacked watermarked frames stays constant, but does not decrease,
therefore colluders are not being punished with visual degradation.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
A. Conclusions
A means to combine existing codebooks such that the resulting combination is more
robust to more general collusion attacks is developed. Existing codes, such as the
BIBD codes [36, 4, 26], and traceability codes [28, 30, 31] can be extended to become
robust to the extended narrow-sense attack, using the methods presented in this the-
sis. Previously, these existing codes are only robust to restrictive attacks, such as
the binary AND, narrow-sense attacks without erasure, respectively. In multimedia
ﬁngerprinting, it is desirable to be robust against less restrictive attacks, since multi-
media can be attacked in various ways, without aﬀecting the visual or audio quality.
The constructions presented by this thesis, hence, enhance the ability of existing codes
to be used in multimedia.
In addition, compared to existing work, the proposed code excels in terms of its
short codeword length when the coalition size is large. The need for large coalition
sizes is justiﬁed for "malicious distributors", a problem not previously considered in
the literature. Existing ﬁngerprinting schemes assume small coalition sizes, which
is appropriate if only the end-users are to collude. However, under the new scenario
where there are many distributors, collusion may exist prior to distribution to the end-
users. This mass collusion attack cannot be adequately traced by existing schemes,
as demonstrated in this thesis.
Almost all ﬁngerprinting schemes are based on codebook design and watermark-
ing. While this is adequate in most cases, this thesis also presents a new paradigm,
which adds an additional dimension to the criteria of a good ﬁngerprinting scheme.
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Existing watermarking schemes do not "punish" collusion attacks with visual degra-
dation. Given enough copies are averaged for example, the resulting media is visually
unaﬀected, while the ﬁngerprint is most likely destroyed. The advantage oﬀered by
the novel Joint Source Fingerprinting paradigm, is that as the number of copies used
in a collusion attack increases, the attacked media exhibits more visually degradation
losing its commercial value. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm
for video is robust to a number of single-user attacks, as well as collusion attacks, and
at the same time oﬀers the required visual degradation from collusion attacks.
The inherent partitioning property of the semantic-feature representation for the
JSF paradigm, allows ﬁngerprinted media to be broadcast eﬃciently to all users,
without the need to specialize transmission for individual users. It is shown that
under certain conditions, the broadcasting scheme resulting from the JSF paradigm,
out-performs existing broadcasting schemes that abide by the same assumptions.
A drawback of the proposed video ﬁngerprinting algorithm, is the robustness to
only a small coalition size. As explained earlier, this is suitable when collusion is
considered at the end-user level. However, if malicious distributors are at play, the
proposed algorithm is easily defeated.
B. Further Research
The ﬁeld of digital ﬁngerprinting is approximately 10 years old when only eﬀective
techniques are considered. Most of the research has focused on codebook design,
with little interest on how the resulting codewords are embedded in the host source
itself. Therefore existing watermarking techniques, most of which do not consider
collusion, may not be appropriate for ﬁngerprinting. The Joint Source Fingerprinting
paradigm is novel, and hence oﬀers various future research possibilities. Some of these
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possibilities are outlined here.
• The choice of the transform T (·) is very important in the JSF paradigm, as this
determines the computational complexity of the ﬁngerprint search problem, as
well as the ﬁngerprinting capacity. The transform leading to the most eﬃcient
ﬁngerprinting search would be one where the visual entropies are additive. If
this is true, then the ﬁngerprinting search problem is optimal under a greedy
algorithm. For example
HV (Ξ, {ϕ1} ∪ {ϕ2} ∪ . . . ∪ {ϕn}) =
n∑
i=1
= HV (Ξ, {ϕi})
which means the visual entropies of the individual HV (Ξ, {ϕi}) can be calculated
in advance, and the search algorithm will greedily choose the largest ones such
that the resulting sum is greater than Hτ . It is also believed transform T (·),
that leads to the condition of additivity of visual entropy, is equivalent to the
the Karhunen-Loeve transform. For example, the Karhunen-Loeve transform
aims to separate the input into uncorrelated components. Components that
exhibit no correlation will most likely result in additivity of visual entropies.
• One possible technique that relates transform coeﬃcients with visual quality, is
the embedded zero-tree wavelet (EZW). It may be possible to use the EZW to
partition wavelet coeﬃcients into many non-overlapping ﬁngerprints. However,
using the EZW alone will result in collusion attacks that easily remove the
ﬁngerprints. Therefore a means to buﬀer this approach is needed.
• While ﬁnding a good transform to speed up computation is important, it is
also important that the transform allows for separation of the media such that
collusion attacks result in visual degradation. The Quasi-JSF paradigm can
also be used, however, instead of using watermarking, a one-way function can
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be applied to each and every frame such that the function is able to mimic true
motion, but not allow any reversal of motion, as well as any additional motion.
• The proposed video ﬁngerprinting algorithm uses motion vectors as an equiva-
lent to visual entropy. Newer means of motion estimation exist in the MPEG-4
and MPEG-7 standards, that allow for other motion models, instead of just
the translational motion model. These methods can be applied to improve
detection, since the desired detector will employ a true motion detector.
• To design a better detector, the motion PDF should be estimated, prior to dis-
tribution, and then used in the ﬁngerprint detection stage. In this thesis, many
assumptions are made as to how the PDF behaves. Although these assumptions
are far less restrictive than the general normal distribution assumption made by
many in this ﬁeld of research, an estimation of the PDF would prove to relax
these assumptions even more. At the same time, an analytical expression for
the probability of error would be derivable.
• The proposed video ﬁngerprinting algorithm can only catch one pirate by taking
the lowest output from the detector. There are several ways that all pirates can
be caught. The ﬁrst method is to estimate the number of pirates nˆ, involved
in the collusion attack, and then take the nˆ lowest outputs from the detector.
Another way to catch all users, is to use the inherent property that every ﬁnger-
printed copy has an underlying binary codeword. The codeword itself can be
used to determine all colluders, much in the same way as presented in Chapter
IV. This, however, would make the detector a hard-decision decoder.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL MULTIMEDIA COLLUSION ATTACKS
From the estimation attack category, the optimal estimation in terms of the mean
square error (MSE) criterion, given frames in {C˜i}Mi=1, is
Cj(x, y) = E[Cj(x, y)|C˜j1(x, y), C˜j2(x, y), . . . , C˜jM(x, y)]
= h(c˜j1(x, y), c˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , c˜
j
M(x, y)),
where Cj(x, y) is an estimate of the jth frame at the (x, y)th pixel of the respective
frame and pixel in C (no ﬁngerprint), and
h(c˜j1(x, y), c˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , c˜
j
M (x, y))
∫ +∞
−∞
z
f
Cj (x,y)C˜
j
1(x,y)C˜
j
2(x,y)...C˜
j
M
(x,y)
(z, c˜j1(x, y), c˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , c˜
j
M (x, y))
f
C˜
j
1(x,y)C˜
j
2(x,y)...C˜
j
M
(x,y)
(c˜j1(x, y), c˜
j
2(x, y), . . . , c˜
j
M (x, y))
dz
(A.1)
fCj(x,y)C˜j1(x,y)C˜
j
2(x,y)...C˜
j
M (x,y)
is the joint probability density function (PDF) of the jth
frame, (x, y)th pixel random variables of C, and {C˜i}Mi=1. fC˜j1(x,y)C˜j2(x,y)...C˜jM (x,y) is the
joint PDF of the jth frame, (x, y)th pixel random variables {C˜i}Mi=1.
Equation A.1 is a result from estimation theory. However, this estimation cannot
be practically implemented, as possession of the PDFs is unlikely. Colluders must
therefore resort to suboptimal estimation techniques.
Another linear attack that is more optimal than Equation 2.10 in the MSE sense,
is given by Equation A.2.
Cj(x, y) =
M∑
i=1
αi
(
C˜ji (x, y)−E[C˜ji (x, y)]
)
+ E[Cj(x, y)] (A.2)
The weights αi in Equation A.2 are obtained by solving Equation A.3 for k =
1, 2, . . .M .
E
[(
Cj(x, y)− E[Cj(x, y)]−
M∑
i=1
αi
(
C˜ji (x, y)−E[C˜ji (x, y)]
)) (
C˜jk(x, y)− E[C˜jk(x, y)]
)]
= 0 (A.3)
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Although Equation A.3 may seem intimidating, it is a linear equation of M equations
(for k = 1, 2, . . . ,M) and M unknowns (αi, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M). The expected values
are more easily estimated than the PDFs in Equation A.1.
Other suboptimal schemes may include adding {C˜j(x, y)}Mj=1, and applying an
FIR ﬁlter as in Equation A.4.
Cj = h(x, y)
M∑
i=1
C˜ji (x, y) (A.4)
h(x, y) is an FIR 2-D spatial ﬁlter, and  is the 2-D convolution operator. The goal
of Equation A.4 is to attenuate the ﬁngerprint by blurring the sum. This attack with
AWGN, is termed the Gaussian Medium Access Channel (GMAC).
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APPENDIX B
LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS CODES
A. Limitations of the Concatenated Separating Code
This section provides restrictions for the (t, t)-separating codes that are not mentioned
in [19]. These ﬁndings will show that the concatenated (t, t)-separating codes are not
suitable for larger coalition sizes, and the proposed novel code can easily outperform
them in terms of codeword length.
First, the probability bound in Equation 3.7 can be simpliﬁed as provided in
Equation B.1.
 ≤ qK2−ND(σ‖ t−1q−1) (B.1)
Since the total codeword length is n = mN , a lower bound for both N and m will be
derived in terms of only t and q, and hence the lower bound for the codeword length
will also be in terms of t and q, providing an accurate comparison of the codeword
length with that of other popular ﬁngerprinting codes.
Equation B.1 is solved for N as provided in Equation B.2.
N ≥
log2
(
qK

)
D
(
σ‖ t−1
q−1
) (B.2)
To express Equation B.2 in terms of only , t, and q, it is noted that for linear
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes N − K + 1 = δN , since W is a linear
(N,K, δN) code, therefore substituting K = (1 − δ)N + 1 into Equation B.2, and
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then solving for N again, results in Equation B.3.
N ≥ log2
(
q

)
D
(
σ‖ t−1
q−1
)
− (1− δ) log2(q)
(B.3)
Both D
(
σ‖ t−1
q−1
)
and δ are only dependent on t and q, so Equation B.3 only depends
on t and q. The restrictions on δ are δ > 1 − 1
t2
+ t−1
t(q−1) , but also δ < 1, since
N > K = (1− δ)N + 1 > 0. This means that δ = 1− 1
t2
+ t−1
t(q−1) + ε, where ε must
satisfy Equation B.4 in order to satisfy both restrictions on δ .
0 < ε <
1
t2
− t− 1
t(q − 1) (B.4)
The reader can check that using an ε that satisﬁes Equation B.4, will also result in
satisfying the constraint that σ ≤ 1. In addition q ≥ t is required (and makes sense
since the size of V , being q, must be larger than its ability to (t, t)-separate) to satisfy
the constraint t−1
q−1 ≤ 1. Most of these conditions are tacitly assumed in [19], however
the next result presented in this thesis is probably overlooked in [19], as it shows the
codeword length to increase exponentially in t.
In [19], the following inequality is given
log2(q)
m
≥ − log2(1− 2
−(2t−1))
2t− 1 −
1
m
(B.5)
for (t, t)-separating codes. Solving for m and replacing the logarithm term by its
Taylor series expansion, results in
m ≤ (2t− 1)(log2(q) + 1)∑∞
n=1
2−(2t−1)n
n
≤ 2(2t−1)(2t− 1)(log2(q) + 1) = O(t2t log2(q)) (B.6)
Since the total length of the code is given by mN , and N does not contain any
exponential terms, the total length is approximately exponential in t.
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As further evidence, consider
lim
m→∞
log2(q)
m
≤ R¯(t, t),
where R¯(t, t) is the asymptotic rate bound. In [49], the asymptotic rate bounds
for (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4), (5, 5)-separating codes are given as 1, 0.2835, 0.06627,
0.01630, 0.004037 respectively. This suggests that perhaps the asymptotic rate bound
decreases exponentially in t when m → ∞, so for large m, m ≈ log2(q)
R¯(t,t)
increases
exponentially with t. The asymptotic rate bound in [49] is given as a recursive formula,
so a close-formed bound is derived here. According to [49], the best asymptotic rate
of a (t, t)-separating code is bounded by two times the best asymptotic rate of a
(t, t)-superimposed code. For the purpose of this thesis, superimposed codes are not
discussed, and only mentioned here to derive a closed-form expression of the rate
bound for separating codes.
R separating-codes(t, u) ≤ 2R superimposed-codes(t, u) (B.7)
The rate bound for superimposed codes is also recursive in [49]. However [50] provides
a closed-form asymptotic rate bound for superimposed codes.
R¯ superimposed-codes(t, u) ≤ (t− 1)
t−1(u− 1)u−1
(t+ u− 2)t+u−2 (B.8)
Substituting Equation B.8 into B.7, and setting both t and u to t, the closed-form
expression for the rate bound of separating codes is given in Equation B.9.
R¯(t, t) ≤ 2−(2t−3) (B.9)
As predicted, the asymptotic rate bound decreases exponentially in t.
Since we are interested in the codeword length for large t, and m > t, it
might be reasonable to assume that for very large t and therefore very large m,
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m ≈ 22t−3 log2(q). The codeword length is approximately given by Equation B.10 for
suﬃciently large t.
total length of codeword > 22t−3 log2(q)
log2
(
q

)
D
(
σ‖ t−1
q−1
)
− (1− δ) log2(q)
(B.10)
Although t and q appear elsewhere other than the power of 2 in Equation B.10, they
do not have an exponential eﬀect, hence the codeword length increases exponentially
with t.
B. Limitations of the Erasable c-TA Codes
In [10], a c-TA code that can tolerate up to s erasures, using Reed-Solomon codes and
the Guruswami-Sudan soft-decision decoder is presented. This section will show that
the ability to tolerate a ﬁxed number of erasures is not enough to qualify the code
as being robust to the extended narrow-sense attack, and hence this code cannot be
used for multimedia ﬁngerprinting, as robustness against erasure is a must.
The linear MDS Reed-Solomon code is used with dmin > n− nc2 + sc2 , where n is
the length of a codeword, s is the number of tolerable erasures, and c is the maximum
coaltion size. Let dmin = n− nc2 + sc2 +D, where D > 0. This means that given any 2
codewords, there will be at least dmin positions that do not match (i.e. there are at
least dmin detectable positions given any coalition). Given that the pirates know that
a c-TA code is being used, the pirates’ best strategy is to erase all detectable marks.
This means that s, being the number of tolerable erasures, should be at least equal
to dmin, or s ≥ n− nc2 + sc2 +D, and solving for s, results in s ≥ n+ D1− 1
c2
.
At the same time, since the code is MDS, dmin = n − k + 1, which implies
n − n
c2
+ s
c2
+ D = n − k + 1. Therefore k = n−s
c2
− D + 1. It is easy to see that if
s ≥ n + D
1− 1
c2
, then k < 0, which cannot hold since 0 < k < n. Hence s cannot be
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greater or equal to dmin, and any two pirates can erase more than s detectable bits,
hence defeating this code.
115
APPENDIX C
MODULATION AND WATERMARKING FOR FINGERPRINTING CODES
This appendix pertains to details of modulation and watermarking tailored for
ﬁngerprinting codes. In particular, modulation and watermarking can be used to con-
ceal ﬁngerprinting codewords, and hence enhance the robustness of these codewords.
A. One-to-Many Modulation
Given a codebook Γ whose codewords are assembled from the alphabet Σ, a one-to-
many modulation scheme can be applied to further conceal the codewords embedded
in the media. Traditionally, the modulation function maps every element in Σ to
one watermark. For example, given a binary alphabet, 0 might be modulated to
watermark W0, and 1 is modulated to watermark W1. However, for ﬁngerprinting
codewords, 0 can be mapped to multiple watermarks, and 1 can also be mapped to
multiple watermarks as is now described.
For every bit position, a diﬀerent modulation function is applied. For example,
for bit position 1, the modulation function might map 0 to W0,1 and 1 to W1,1.
However for bit position 2, the modulation function can map 0 to W0,2 = W0,1 and
1 to W1,2 = W1,1. When a sequence of watermarks is extracted from the watermark
extraction function, the demodulation function knows that the ﬁrst watermark is
demodulated according to W0,1 → 0 and W1,1 → 1, and the second watermark is
demodulated according to W0,2 → 0 and W1,2 → 1. From this example, a binary
codeword γi = γi1γ
i
2 · · ·γil is modulated according to the bit-wise modulator:
M(γik) =
 W0,k if γ
i
k = 0
W1,k if γ
i
k = 1
(C.1)
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Here M is a function from Σ = {0, 1} to W, which is diﬀerent from the modulation
function in Deﬁnition 9. In addition, W0,k and W1,k must be unique, however it is
possible to have W0,k = W1,j for k = j, which can confuse the attackers.
B. Erasure in Multimedia
For extended narrow-sense or wide-sense attacks, the detectable bit can be "erased"
or mapped to any symbol that is not in Σ. This section shows that for multimedia,
erasure is restricted.
In any watermarking algorithm, a transform coeﬃcient of an image can only be
changed by an amount that will not aﬀect the visual quality of the resulting image
[1, 22, 51]. Therefore if a coalition of pirates detects diﬀerences in a set of coeﬃcients,
the amount of change that they can apply to these coeﬃcients is also limited. Figure
28 shows the eﬀects of randomly erasing 1% of the DCT coeﬃcients in an image, by
setting these coeﬃcients to 0. Distortion is evident in the background of Figure 28(b).
Figure 29 shows the eﬀect of randomly erasing 6% of the db2 wavelet coeﬃcients, by
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Fig. 28. (a) Original Image; (b) Image After 1% (Random) of the DCT Coeﬃcients
Are Set to 0
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setting these coeﬃcients to 0. Distortion is evident in the grainy edges and lips of
Figure 29(b).
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Fig. 29. (a) Original Image; (b) Image After 6% (Random) of the db2 Wavelet Coef-
ﬁcients Are Set to 0
In general, when a coalition of pirates detects diﬀerences in transform coeﬃcients,
they can only alter these coeﬃcients by a certain amount. Therefore the modulation
function can even modulated a 0 in a ﬁxed bit position, for example, to diﬀerent
watermarks that share some similarities with one another. If a coalition of pirates
detects these diﬀerent watermarks all representing 0, the amount of altering that they
can achieve without visual distortion will not be enough to fool the demodulation
function, which will still detect a 0 after the watermarks have been "erased". The
modulation function is then given by:
M(γik) =
 W0,i,k if γ
i
k = 0
W1,i,k if γ
i
k = 1
(C.2)
where W0,i,k’s are "similar" for all varying i and ﬁxed k, and W1,i,k’s are "similar"
for all varying i and ﬁxed k. The design and implementation of such modulators and
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demodulators are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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APPENDIX D
DETAILS PERTAINING TO THE PROPOSED SUB-OPTIMAL JSF
ALGORITHM
A. Justiﬁcation of Using the Minimum Average Motion Distance Detector
As in the body of this thesis, let Φi = (φi,1, φi,2, . . . , φi,n) be a set of frames corre-
sponding to the ﬁngerprints for User i. Let Φ˜ = (φ˜1, φ˜2, . . . , φ˜n) be the set of frames
created by a collusion attack as deﬁned by the body of this thesis. The soft-decision
maximum likelihood detector will choose one suspect based on Equation D.1.
user i is a suspect = argmax
i
Pr[Φ˜ | Φi] (D.1)
The following set of equations will justify the use of the minimum average motion
distance. Many assumptions need to be made, because the probability density func-
tion of Pr[Φ˜ | Φi] is unknown and can never be estimated if the collusion attack is
unrestricted. It will be shown that these assumptions are better than just assuming
a popular distribution, such as the Gaussian distribution.
Pr[Φ˜ | Φi] = Pr[φ˜1, φ˜2, . . . , φ˜n | φi,1, φi,2, . . . , φi,n] (D.2)
=
n∏
j=1
Pr[φ˜j | φi,j] (D.3)
=
n∏
j=1
h(φ˜j) exp(−AM(φ˜j , φi,j)) (D.4)
=
(
n∏
j=1
h(φ˜j)
)
exp
(
−
n∑
k=1
AM(φ˜k, φi,k)
)
(D.5)
∴ argmax
i
Pr[Φ˜ | Φi] = argmin
i
n∑
k=1
AM(φ˜k, φi,k) (D.6)
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Equation D.3 is arrived at by assuming φi,1, φi,2, . . . , φi,n are independent, φ˜1, φ˜2, . . . , φ˜n
are independent, and φ˜i is independent of φj for all j = i. The ﬁrst independence as-
sumption holds if the frames φi,1, φi,2, . . . , φi,n are not consecutive, and spaced out far
enough - if these conditions hold, then the second assumption will automatically hold,
because collusion will only occur with frames that are somewhat close to one another.
In practice, this assumption does not always hold, since the frames φi,1, φi,2, . . . , φi,n
are probably correlated.
Equation D.4 ﬁrst assumes that the average motion increases when frames be-
come further apart. In general, this assumption is valid, unless moving objects in
the frames return to a position that occured in a previous frame. Given that this
assumption is true, assume that frame φi,j is indeed part of a ﬁngerprint from the
coalition. Then any attacked frame generated with φi,j being part of the collusion
attack will in general be a function of the frames that are close to φi,j. This means
that the probability that AM(φ˜j , φi,j) is small, is very high, while the probability
that AM(φ˜j , φi,j) is large, is very small. Therefore, given φi,j is part of the collusion
attack, Pr[φ˜j | φi,j] is a decreasing function of AM(φ˜j , φi,j). In order to get a nice
closed-form expression, it is assumed that this function is a decreasing exponential.
The other equations follow from Equation D.4.
These assumptions made in deriving the minimum average motion detector are
actually less stringent than just assuming a popular probability density function for
Pr[φ˜j | φi,j]. For example, the Gaussian PDF is usually assumed, however this as-
sumption leads to the minimum Euclidean distance detector, which cannot be used
as pointed out in Chapter V. In addition, the simulations are run on the weakest
input as mentioned in Chapter V, but still give good results. Most of the frames in
the test input video are highly correlated with one another, since there is not much
motion, so the ﬁrst independence assumption is violated; even so, the performance
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of this detector is far better than the minimum Euclidean distance detector, which
almost always failed at correctly identifying a suspect.
B. Proof of Equation 5.22 for Supporting a Larger Set of Users
Let n be the original number of ﬁngerprints, and N  n be the new number of
ﬁngerprints. Let L be the number of partitions, and c < n
2
be the maximum size of
the coalition. Given a word w˜, at least L
c
positions will match with one of the pristine
codewords wi ∈W of the attackers. This is based on the pigeonhole principle, where
each of the original c codewords is analogous to c pigeonholes, while the L partitions
represent L pigeons; at least one pigeonhole will contain at least L
c
pigeons. The proof
will show that random words that are not part of the coalition of attackers will match
in at least L
c
positions with the probability approximation presented in Equation 5.22.
The probability that a random codeword matching in x positions to w˜ is de-
scribed by a binomial random variable X, with parameters (L, 1
n
), where the success
probability of one position matching is 1
n
, since the alphabet size is n. X can also be
approximated by a Gaussian random variable Y , with the same mean L
n
and variance
L(n−1)
n2
, since L is typically very large, while n is about 10.
P
(
X ≥ L
c
)
≈ P
(
Y ≥ L
c
)
(D.7)
= Q
(√
L
n− 1
(n
c
− 1
))
(D.8)
Since there are N codewords in total, the union bound is then given by Equation
5.22, completing the proof.
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APPENDIX E
ADDITIONAL SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE JSF ALGORITHM
This appendix provides additional simulation results to those presented in Chap-
ter V. The test video in this section is fundamentally diﬀerent from the test video used
in Chapter V, in that the motion in this test video is a zooming motion. Although
the translation model is not accurate for this video, the simulation results show that
the proposed algorithm still correctly identiﬁes one pirate, and also provides visual
degradation against collusion attacks.
In Figure 30, the single-user attacks do not mimic motion, hence cannot fool the
detector. In Figures 31 and 33, one pirate is always correctly identiﬁed. In Figures 32
and 34, the attacked frames from the proposed algorithm incur visual distortion, while
the attacked frames from the DCT-based (Figure 32(c)) and wavelet-based (Figure
34(c)) watermarking techniques [1, 22] are perceptually similar to the original frames.
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Fig. 30. Average Motion Between Consecutive Frames and False Average Motion from
Single-User Attacks
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Fig. 31. Y-axis on Each Graph Is the Average Motion Distance Between the Average
Attacked Video (Averaging of Fingerprinted Videos Whose Bars Are Red)
and the Fingerprinted Video (Whose Number Is on the X-axis)
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Fig. 32. (a) Original Frame; (b) Blurry Frame After Average Attack; (c) Average
Attack on 60 Watermarked Frames
126
1 2 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fig. 33. Y-axis on Each Graph Is the Average Motion Distance Between the Random
Scrambling Attacked Video (Random Scrambling of Fingerprinted Videos
Whose Bars Are Red) and the Fingerprinted Video (Whose Number Is on
the X-axis)
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Fig. 34. (a) Original Frame; (b) Distortion After a Random Scrambling Attack; (c)
Random Scrambling on 60 Watermarked Frames
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